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1 Introduction
A central paradigm in political economy, introduced in Barros and Ferejohns seminal work,
emphasizes the role of elections and constitutional checks in controlling elected politicians. Ac-
cording to this paradigm, politicians are the agents of citizens (voters) to whom various policy
decisions have been delegated, and elections are used to ensure that politicians carry out the
citizenswishes, minimize their rents, and limit the policies that they pursue for their own self-
interest or ideological agendas. It is also well recognized that elections by themselves may be
insu¢ cient to ensure e¤ective control of politicians and citizens may wish to rely on other po-
litical institutions, such as various forms of checks and balances and separation of powers which
further constrain the behavior of politicians and are complementary to elections. This view of
politics and the role of constitutional checks was clearly articulated by James Madison in the
Federalist Papers, where he wrote:
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
di¢ culty lies in this: you must rst enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind
the necessity of auxiliary precautions.(Federalist Papers, # 51, 1788).
Madisons auxiliary precautionsinclude the separation of powers between the executive and
a bicameral legislature, indirect election of senators, and an electoral college for determining the
president. A version of these ideas has been formalized by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997,
2000) who show how a set of political institutions which separates decision-making power over
spending and taxation reduces the amount of rents that politicians can extract.
According to Madison and the formal literature building on his insights, voters should be
in favor of such checks and balances. Yet, in several cases in Latin America, voters have will-
ingly, sometimes enthusiastically, removed checks and balances designed to limit the ability of
politicians (in particular presidents) to pursue their own policy agendas or capture rents.1 For
example, after his rst election in 1998 President Hugo Chávez organized a constitutional assem-
bly which re-wrote the constitution moving to a unicameral legislature, reallocating legislative
powers to the president particularly in the economic and nancial spheres. The new constitution
was ratied by 72% of the people who voted in a plebiscite in December 1999. In 2000 President
Chávez obtained the right to rule by decree for a year without having to get the approval of
the legislature. In 2007 this power was renewed and extended to 18 months. It was renewed
again in December 2010 for another 18 months. Most of these constitutions and decrees have
been approved in referenda, in many cases with large majorities. Corrales and Penfold (2011,
pp. 1-2) characterize the situation as one where freedom exists and the opposition is allowed
1See Carey, Neto and Shugart (1997) for an overview of di¤erent presidential powers in Latin America, and
Carey and Shugart (1998) for a comparative perspective on presidential decree power.
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to compete in elections, but the system of checks and balances becomes inoperative,and this
outcome has occurred in the context of signicant electoral support. Venezuela under Chávez
has conducted plenty of elections ... and chavista forces have prevailed in all but one.
On September 28, 2008, 64% of Ecuadorian voters enacted a new constitution also with
unicameral legislature and increased the powers for president Rafael Correa, who took control of
monetary policy back from the central bank and gained the power to suspend the legislature. He
was also allowed to run for two more consecutive terms. On January 25, 2009, 61% of Bolivian
voters approved a similar new constitution signicantly increasing Evo Moraless powers. Like
Chávez and Correa before him, Morales also managed to remove the one-term limit on his
presidency, which is commonly interpreted as a signicant strengthening of presidential powers
(see Carey, 2003).2
These recent constitutional changes strengthening presidential power followed on the coattails
of similar changes throughout Latin America. The 1979 Constitutions of Ecuador and Peru, the
1988 Constitution of Brazil and the 1992 Constitution of Paraguay all gave presidents the ability
to invoke urgency bills that must be voted on within a time limit, signicantly increasing their
legislative powers. A growing number of constitutions, including the 1988 Constitution of Brazil,
the 1993 Constitution of Peru and the 1994 amendment to the Constitution of Argentina, all
strengthened the powers of the executive to legislate by enacting decrees.
These salient events highlight two important points. Firstly, the extent of checks and balances
in democratic political systems should be thought of as an equilibrium outcome rather than as
a historically or exogenously given, immutable institutional characteristic. Secondly and more
importantly, the most widely used paradigm for understanding checks and balances is, by itself,
insu¢ cient for thinking about why the majority of voters may wish to remove such checks, since
it would suggest that the majority of the citizens should support maximal checks on presidents.
In this paper, we provide a simple theory of equilibrium checks and balances, highlighting
why, under certain circumstances, voters may prefer less rather than more checks and balances.
At the center of our theory is the following observation: in weakly-institutionalized polities,
checks and balances, by reducing politician rents, make them cheaper to buy or easier to
inuence by an organized rich elite through bribing, lobbying or other non-electoral means.3
This makes checks and balances a double-edged sword: what makes them valuable to voters
limiting politician rents also makes them potentially dangerous to the majority.
We consider a society consisting of rich and poor individuals. The poor form the majority
and will be able to elect the president, and will also be decisive in a referendum on checks and
balances. Politicians are self-interested, but also put some weight on the utility of citizens from
their own group, so presidents from the poor group (or more generally from parties representing
2But unlike Chávez and Correa, Morales did not have su¢ cient power in the constitutional assembly to get
everything that he wanted. His party, Movement Towards Socialism, did not have the 2/3 majority required to
unilaterally determine constitutional provisions. He was thus unable to get many of the clauses he wanted, such
as a unicameral legislature and perpetual presidential re-election.
3Alternative explanations for this pattern could be developed along the lines of the model in Aghion, Alesina
and Trebbi (2004), which we discuss in detail below and explain why we prefer our explanation.
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the poor) will not only use their power to capture rents, but will also redistribute income to the
poor. In weakly-institutionalized polities, the rich elite, because it is better organized, wealthier
or better connected, often has a greater role in politics than its sheer number would suggest. We
model these general non-electoral inuences by assuming that, with some probability, the elite is
able to bribe or lobby politicians in order to induce policies that it prefers, and in particular, to
reduce the extent of redistribution. A president not subject to checks and balances can obtain
his political bliss pointby both redistributing to the poor and also capturing rents for himself.
This implies that the rich elite is relatively powerless against such a president. In contrast,
under checks and balances, the president receives few rents, and the rich elite can more easily
capture politics by lobbying or bribing the president. Consequently, when the likelihood that the
rich elite will be able to bribe the politician is low, the majority of the voters prefer checks and
balances as suggested by Madison and several previous political-economic analyses. In contrast,
when the likelihood that the rich elite will be able to bribe the politician is high, poor voters are
happy to put up with the rents that the politician will capture (or certain idiosyncratic policies
that they wish to adopt, for example, as in the case of Hugo Chávez) in return for the guarantee
that the politician will not be bought by the rich elite.
There are several natural comparative statics that result from this framework. Equilibrium
checks and balances are more likely to emerge when the likelihood that the rich elite will be
able to organize, solve their collective action problem and bribe politicians is low, and when the
potential for taxation of incomes is limited (because when the potential for taxation is high, the
extent of redistribution will be high unless the president is bribed). Using a simple extension of
the model, we also show that equilibrium checks and balances are more likely to emerge when
income inequality is low (because in this case the value of redistributive taxation to the poor
majority is more limited).
To communicate the main ideas of the paper in the clearest possible fashion, we adopt a
simple model of checks and balances as separation of powers whereby the president chooses the
level of taxes and transfers, while the legislature can a¤ect the allocation of rents (for example,
between projects that the president or the legislature prefers). This modeling approach ensures
that when there are checks and balances, the equilibrium level of rents is zero. Though extreme,
this approach sharply captures the main impact of checks and balances to reduce politician
rents. We show in an online appendix that the main insights do not depend on this modeling
approach by demonstrating that the same results hold under di¤erent assumptions on the form
of separation of powers. In particular, we derive similar results using a model in which the extent
of checks and balances is captured with the presence (and number) of veto players along the
lines of Diermeier and Myerson (1999) and Tsebelis (2002). We also show that identical results
apply when separation of powers is modeled as the separation of taxation and spending decisions
(between the president and legislature, respectively) as in Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997,
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2000).4 We also show that our general results are robust to di¤erent forms of utility functions
for politicians and study the role of legislative institutions that give greater voice to political
minorities(e.g., including representatives of minority groups, here the elite, in the legislature).
We also present some evidence supporting the ideas we develop. First, we discuss the reason-
ing articulated by key players and the interpretation of experts in the dismantling the legislative
checks on presidential power in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. In each case, there is a fair bit
of evidence that the argument for these reforms was the excessive control that the oligarchyex-
ercised, particularly because of separation of powers or because of their control of the legislature
(though, perhaps not surprisingly, the idea that checks and balances make presidents cheaper to
buydoes not explicitly appear in these presidentsspeeches). Second, we analyze survey data
from 18 Latin American countries to provide some support for the notion that voters dismantle
checks and balances when they are afraid that the rich elite will be able to use them to control
politics. In particular, we focus on data for the year 2008 from the Latin American Public
Opinion Project, which includes a question on support for the president closing the congress as
well as information on income and questions on attitudes towards inequality and whether the
individual views the elite (dominant class or oligarchy) as the biggest obstacle to progress. We
identify countries where the elite is more likely to have captured the political system in one of
three ways: as those where citizens view the elite as the major roadblock against progress in
the survey, or as those where there have been referenda or other reforms to increase presidential
powers (which, according to our theory, are exactly those that are so captured), or those where,
according to commonly used measures, democracy is weaker, bureaucratic corruption is more
rampant, there is greater political instability or oil is more important in the economy (as a source
of rents encouraging such capture). We then report evidence suggesting that in more captured
democracies individuals with lower incomes and with more pro-redistribution views are more
likely to support the president closing down the congress compared to countries with stronger
democracies. We interpret this evidence as broadly supportive of the mechanism proposed in
this paper.
Our paper is related to several literatures. First, it is closely related to the literature on
the separation of powers. In addition to Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000), which we
have already discussed, a large political science literature studies the implications of di¤erent
democratic political institutions on policies and politicians rents (e.g., Lijphart, 1992, Shugart
and Carey, 1992, Huber, 1996, Baron, 1998, Diermeier and Myerson, 1999, Tsebelis, 2002).
Second, our paper is also related to other studies emphasizing the potential failure of electoral
and institutional controls on politicians (e.g., Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier, 2004, La Ferrara
and Bates, 2001, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, Padro-i-Miquel, 2007, Lizzeri and Persico, 2004,
4 In practice, the interactions between the president and the legislature are more complex than these models
allow. Even under the most extreme separation of powers, the president can obtain some policy concessions and
rents, and he or she is far from powerless in inuencing how tax revenues are spent, for example, by using the
presidential veto power. Equally, the legislature is, more often than not, involved in tax decisions as much as in
spending. We do not wish to argue that any of these models is the rightapproach to the separation of powers.
Instead, our purpose is to show that our main results hold under di¤erent models of separation of powers.
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Robinson and Verdier, 2012) and to models of elite capture of democratic politics, for example,
Grossman and Helpman (2001), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) and Acemoglu, Ticchi and
Vindigni (2011).
Finally, a number of authors develop di¤erent but complementary ideas to our paper. Aghion
and Bolton (2003) and Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) develop normative approaches with
the implication that ex-post citizens may wish to delegate di¤erent amounts of powers to a
politician depending on how aligned their interests are. There is no redistributional conict
or the possibility that a rich elite may bribe politicians away from the wishes of the majority.
Thus the results and the underlying economic mechanism are very di¤erent, and we nd the
mechanism we propose both richer from a theoretical point of view but more importantly also
more relevant for understanding Latin American politics where powerful leaders have recently
played an important role Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2011) develop a model of populism based
on the idea that in weakly-institutionalized democracies politicians may choose platforms to the
left of the median voter as a way of signaling that they are not (secretly) to the right of the
median or that they are not secretly corrupted by the elite. None of these papers develops a
model of equilibrium checks and balances or notes the main intuition of our paper, that checks
and balances make politicians cheaper to bribe or inuence through non-electoral means.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up a simple model of checks
and balances to present our main argument as transparently as possible. We also extend this
simple model to allow for an independent judiciary. Section 3 provides case study evidence and
econometric evidence from Latin American survey data to document a signicant link between
concerns about elite control of politics and willingness to increase presidential powers against
other branches of government. In the online appendix we discuss a number of extensions, in
particular modeling checks and balances with veto players, considering an alternative modeling
of the separation of powers, allowing minority groups in the legislature who have dispropor-
tionate power, and alternative utility functions for the politicians. Although these extensions
and changes introduce new and interesting e¤ects, the basic intuition from the simple model in
Section 2 still remains valid. Section 4 concludes.
2 Basic Model
In this section, we use a simple formalization of the workings of politics under checks and
balances (or separation of powers) to communicate the basic ideas in our paper. We assume
that the president is able to implement his favorite policies without checks and balances, while
with checks and balances, some elements of his policy agenda can be modied by the legislature.
2.1 Demographics and Preferences
We consider a static economy populated by a continuum of agents, with measure normalized to
1. A proportion 1    > 1=2 of the population are poorwith pre-tax income yp > 0, while
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the remaining  are rich and have pre-tax income yr > yp. Throughout we use superscript
i 2 fp; rg to denote whether an individual is from the poor or the rich income group. The utility
of individual j is given by
U j = cj ; (1)
where cj  0 denotes her consumption. With a slight abuse of notation, we use U j to denote
the utility of individual j and U i, for i 2 fp; rg, to represent the utility of a typical poor or rich
agent (in equilibrium agents within an income group will all have the same utility).
For future reference, we dene average income in the society as
y  (1  ) yp + yr,
and we also dene  2 (0; 1) as the share of total income accruing to rich agents, i.e.,
yr  

y;
and naturally yp  (1  )y= (1  ). This formulation implies that  is a measure of inequality
in the society: greater  corresponds to greater inequality.
2.2 Policies, Politicians and the Constitution
The government, consisting of the president and the legislature, will determine taxes and trans-
fers. We assume that the only tax instrument is a proportional tax rate denoted by  2 [0; 1],
and tax revenues can be redistributed to the poor as a lumpsum transfer denoted by T p  0,
and to the rich using the lumpsum transfer T r  0.5 In addition, tax revenues also nance rents
for politicians. We assume that there is a maximum tax rate  < 1, so that  2 [0;  ]. This may
result from the ability of each individual to hide their incomes if taxes are too high.6 Thus there
is a political conict between the rich and the poor on how much income redistribution there
should be, although the interpretation of our mechanisms may also include political conicts
other than those based on di¤erences in income.
We denote the president by P . We also simplify the analysis by assuming that the legislature
consists of a single agent, and we denote the legislator by L.7 With this notation, we denote the
rents captured by the president by RP  0, and the rents captured by the legislator by RL  0.
The government budget constraint then requires total spending, on transfers and the rents to
politicians, to be less than total tax revenues, given by  y, i.e.,
(1  )T p + T r +RL +RP   y: (2)
Given this specication, policy can be represented by a vector

 ; T p; T r; RL; RP
	
(such that
(2) holds and all elements of this vector are nonnegative, which is presumed throughout the rest
of the analysis without stating this explicitly).
5T p and T r can alternatively be interpreted as group-specic public goods.
6For example, we could suppose that each individual could hide their entire income in the informal sector and
receive (1  ) yj . This specication implies that taxes greater than  would never be set.
7The case of multimember legislature is discussed in the online appendix.
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The exact policy-making procedure depends on the constitution, which takes one of two
forms:
1. The constitution may specify checks and balances, denoted by  = 1, in which case the
president and the legislator will jointly set policies. In particular, in this section we as-
sume that the president announces a policy vector with tax rate, transfers and rents,
 ; T p; T r; RL; RP
	
and the legislator can only change the allocation of rents

RL; RP
	
(i.e., he is unable to change  , T p and T r).8
2. The constitution may specify no checks and balances,  = 0, in which case all decision-
making power is vested in the president. The president then determines the entire policy
vector

 ; T p; T r; RL; RP
	
.
Observe that under both types of constitutions, policies are decided by politicians. This
implies, in particular, that there is no commitment to policies at the time of elections or any
time before implementation of the policies. We assume that citizens in this society rst vote
in a referendum over the formal constitution, in particular on whether it should include checks
and balances, and then vote in the election of the president and the legislator. We describe the
timing of events in greater detail below.
Politicians belong to one of the two income groups, and they care about the utility of their
income group and about their own rents and bribes. We view the feature that politicians
care about their social groups income as both a realistic assumption (in particular, given that
politicians from a specic social group will often have their and their familieseconomic fortunes
tied to the rest of the group) and also a reduced-form way of capturing the impact of the party of
the politician, his ideology or his concern about his longer-term political career on his behavior.
More specically, a politician j from income group i 2 fp; rg has utility given by
V j;i = v
 
Rj + bj

+ (1  )U i; (3)
where  2 (0; 1), bj  0 denotes the bribes for politician j, and v is a strictly increasing,
strictly concave and continuously di¤erentiable function describing the utility for politicians
from rents and bribes. We also assume that this function satises the Inada-type conditions:
limR+b!0 v0 (R+ b) = 1 and limR+b! y v0 (R+ b) = 0, and we normalize v(0) = 0. The
convenient feature implied by (3) is that because the utility function of the politicians is quasi-
linear in U i, the amount of rents a politician will choose is independent of the level of utility
of his group.9 In what follows, we use V l;i to denote the utility of a politician of income group
i 2 fp; rg holding o¢ ce l 2 fL;Pg.
8 In the online appendix, we extend the model by following Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000), in assuming
that under checks and balances the president decides the tax rate while the legislature decides the spending vector.
9The important feature for our results is that the politician should choose an intermediate level of rents for
himself and that when they are lower, he should be more willing to sacrice the utility of his constituency for
increasing these rents. Quasi-linear preferences yield this feature in a simple way. Below and also in the online
appendix, we show that the same results can be obtained without quasi-linearity. Note also that if the politicians
only cared about rents (i.e.,  = 1), then, as will be clear below, the poor would never want to remove checks
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We also assume that for both the o¢ ce of the presidency and the legislature, there are two
candidates, each randomly elected from one of the income groups. Thus there will be one rich
and one poor candidate for presidency, and one rich and one poor candidate for the legislature.
This assumption simply ensures that voting is over two candidates. None of our results are
a¤ected if there are more than two candidates and voting takes place with transferable votes.
Moreover, we assume that the quality of politicians is exogenous.10
Since 1  > 1=2, the poor form the majority and have an electoral advantage. To counteract
this, we assume that the rich are better organized and are sometimes able to exert additional
inuence by bribing (or lobbying) politicians. This is possible when the rich are able to solve
their collective action problem and can organize to bribe politicians. How this collective action
problem is solved is not essential for our analysis, and we assume that they are able to do so
with probability q 2 [0; 1]. When the rich are able to solve their collective action problem, we
denote this by  = 1, with  = 0 denoting the converse.
When the rich are able to do so, they can pay a bribe bP  0 to the president and/or bL  0 to
the legislature. We follow the lobbying literature, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1994),
by assuming that bribes are paid conditional on the delivery of a certain policy. Thus a bribe
o¤er to politician j is a vector
n
b^j ; ^ ; T^ p; T^ r; R^L; R^P
o
such that if the politician implementsn
^ ; T^ p; T^ r; R^L; R^P
o
, he receives b^j , and zero otherwise. In fact, in what follows we can, without
loss of any generality, restrict the bribe o¤ers to depend only on the policy components that the
politician in question directly controls, and thus under no checks and balances, we simply focus
on
n
b^P ; ^ ; T^ p; T^ r; R^L; R^P
o
as the bribe o¤er for the president, and under checks and balances,
we can focus on
n
b^P ; ^ ; T^ p; T^ r
o
for the president and
n
b^L; R^L; R^P
o
for the legislator.
If the rich pay a total bribe of B = bL + bP , each rich agent contributes equally, i.e., an
amount B=. Consequently, given a policy vector

 ; T p; T r; RL; RP
	
, the utilities of poor and
rich agents can be written as
Up = (1  )yp + T p; (4)
and
U r = (1  )yr + T r   b
L + bP

: (5)
2.3 Timing of Events and Equilibrium Concept
To summarize, the timing of events is as follows.
1. There is a referendum on whether the constitution should include checks and balances,
and balances. If politicians did not care about rents (i.e.,  = 0), then the equilibrium would be the same with
or without checks and balances. Finally, if utility were linear in its arguments, then either a politician would use
all revenues as transfers or use all revenues as rents; in either case there would not be a tradeo¤ in the model.
10As pointed out by Caselli and Morelli (2004), allowing politicians higher utility may result in a higher quality
of agents selected into politics. Such selection e¤ects would provide another reason for the voters to prefer the
removal of checks and balances, this time to increase the utility of the president and improve the quality of
politicians.
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i.e., there is a vote between  = 0 and  = 1. Whichever constitution receives an absolute
majority is implemented.
2. Elections are held simultaneously for the o¢ ce of the president and for the legislature.
Whichever candidate receives an absolute majority in each post is elected.
3. All uncertainty is revealed. In particular, it becomes common knowledge whether the rich
will be able to solve their collective action problem.
4. If the rich are able to solve their collective action problem, then they make bribe o¤ers to
the president and the legislator.
5. If the constitution does not include checks and balances, then the president decides the
entire policy vector

 ; T p; T r; RL; RP
	
.
If the constitution includes checks and balances, then the president proposes a policy vector
 ; T p; T r; RL; RP
	
. After observing this policy vector, the legislator decides whether to
change the allocation of rents

RL; RP
	
.
6. Policies are implemented, bribes are paid, and all payo¤s are realized.
A strategy for poor agents simply determines their votes in the referendum and in the election
for the presidency and the legislature. A strategy for rich agents determines their votes in the
referendum and for the presidency and the legislature, and given the realization of uncertainty
about the collective action problem, it also determines their bribe o¤ers. A strategy for a
politician determines policies as a function of the bribe o¤er of the rich lobby. A subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) is dened, as usual, as a strategy prole in which all actions are best
responses to other strategies in all histories. Since individuals take part in (multiple rounds
of) voting, the set of SPE includes unreasonable equilibria in which all individuals use weakly
dominated strategies (voting in favor of politicians that give them strictly lower utility because
everybody else is doing so). We therefore focus on SPE in undominated strategies, and we refer
to these simply as equilibrium throughout.11
We next characterize the equilibria of the economy described so far by backward induction.
We start with a given constitution, a given election outcome, and given types of politicians.
We then characterize policy choices for di¤erent bribe o¤ers (if any) from the rich lobby. After
this characterization, we go to the earlier stages of the game, where we determine voting over
politicians and voting in the referendum between constitutions with and without checks and
balances. A full characterization of equilibrium would specify policies for any combination of
11A further technical detail is that because voting is dynamic (rst in the referendum and then for politicians), a
slightly stronger notion than elimination of weakly dominated strategies is necessary. Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin
(2009) propose sequentially eliminating weakly dominated strategies or the slightly stronger concept of Markov
Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium for this class of games and show that either equilibrium notion eliminates all
unreasonable equilibria and exists in nite games with agenda-setting structure. All of the equilibria studied
here are Markov Trembling Hand Perfect. In fact, here, it is simply su¢ cient to eliminate equilibria where
individuals vote for constitution/politicians that give them (strictly) lower utility.
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politicians (rich president versus poor legislator, etc.). However, we show below that even taking
into account the possibility of bribes, the poor always prefer to elect presidents and legislators
from their own group. For this reason, we limit attention (without loss of any generality) to
situations in which all politicians are from the poor income group.12
2.4 Equilibrium without Checks and Balances
Suppose that the referendum has led to a constitution without checks and balances, i.e.,  = 0.
In this case, all policies are decided by the president, and we can ignore the legislator.
Consider rst the case in which  = 0 so that the rich are not able to solve their collective
action problem and will not make a bribe o¤er. Then, in the policy-making subgame, the
president will solve the program
V P;p [ = 0;  = 0]  max
f ;T p;T r;RL;RP g
v
 
RP

+ (1  ) ((1  )yp + T p) ;
subject to the government budget constraint (2) (where, as usual, all of the elements of the vector
f ; T p; T r; RL; RP g are implicitly taken to be nonnegative) and the constraint that    . This
expression also denes V P;p [ = 0;  = 0] as the value of the maximized program, i.e., the value
of the president under no checks and balances and when the rich are not able to solve the
collective action problem to bribe him. In view of the strict concavity of v, this problem has a
unique solution. Moreover, the solution will involve all incomes being taxed at the maximum
rate,  , with all the proceeds spent on rents to the president and transfers to the poor (so that
government budget constraint (2) holds as equality). The rents to the president are given by R
such that
v0 (R) =
1  
1   : (6)
The Inada-type conditions we imposed on v ensure that R is feasible given the government
budget constraint, i.e., R <  y. Then the transfer is given by T p = ( y   R)=(1   ). Note
for future reference that in this case the utility of poor agents is given by
Up [ = 0;  = 0] =
(1   + ) y  R
1   : (7)
Next, suppose that  = 1. In this case, the rich lobby can make a bribe o¤er,n
b^P ; ^ ; T^ p; T^ r; R^P
o
to the president. Let the utility that the president derives from accepting
this o¤er and implementing the specied policy vector be V P;p

b^P ; ^ ; T^ p; T^ r; R^P

. By turning
down this o¤er, the president can always obtain V P;p [ = 0;  = 0]. Therefore, the bribe o¤er
by the rich lobby must satisfy the presidents participation constraint
V P;p

b^P ; ^ ; T^ p; T^ r; R^P

 V P;p [ = 0;  = 0] (8)
 v (R) + (1  ) (1   + ) y  R

1   ;
12We relax this assumption when we study multi-member legislatures in the online appendix.
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where the second relation uses (7). Imposing that there will be no bribes for the legislature in
this case, the problem of the rich lobby can be written as
U r

b^P ; ^ ; T^ p; T^ r; R^P

 max
fb^P ;T^ p;T^ r;R^P ;^g
(1  ^) yr + T^ r   b^
P

;
subject to (2), (8) and ^   . If the solution to this program gives the rich a utility level no
greater than U r [ = 0;  = 0], then they prefer not to o¤er bribes (which is equivalent to making
an o¤er identical to what the president would have chosen by himself together with b^P = 0).
We show in Appendix A that the rich lobby can never get strictly higher utility by o¤ering
a bribe to the president. The president decides all policy variables. Consequently, no o¤er
from the rich lobby that increases their own utility is acceptable to the politician (because the
politician is already at his bliss point and does not wish to reduce the income of himself or the
poor). Formally, we show that all o¤ers
n
b^P ; ^ ; T^ p; T^ r; R^P
o
the rich lobby can make that would
be accepted by the president would have to give at least as much income to the poor and rents
(plus bribes) to the president, and thus cannot make the rich better o¤. Given this, without
loss of any generality, in what follows we suppose that there is no bribery, i.e., b^P = 0. In fact,
this result also implies that with a small cost of bribery (which is plausible), the unique solution
to the rich lobbys maximization problem would be zero bribes. Finally, it also follows that the
utility of the poor is the same regardless of whether the rich lobby being organized or not, i.e.,
Up [ = 0;  = 0] = Up [ = 0;  = 1] = Up [ = 0].
The intuition for this result, though simple, is worth emphasizing. Because the president is
politically powerful under a constitution that does not feature checks and balances, he obtains
a high level of utility; in fact, here the president is able to obtain his political bliss point.
Importantly, this makes him expensive to bribe and thus unprotable for the rich lobby to
inuence policy.
The following proposition summarizes the results discussed in this subsection (proof in the
text).
Proposition 1 Suppose the constitution involves no checks and balances (i.e.,  = 0). Then,
regardless of whether  = 0 or  = 1, the equilibrium policy involves  =  , RP = R (as given
by (6)), RL = 0, bP = 0, bL = 0, T r = 0, and T p = ( y  R) = (1  ). The utility of poor
agents in this case is given by (7).
2.5 Equilibrium under Checks and Balances
Suppose now that the referendum has led to a constitution  = 1 with checks and balances. In
this case the president proposes the policy vector

 ; T p; T r; RL; RP
	
. Given this policy vector,
the legislator can decide to change the allocation of rents, i.e., he e¤ectively decides

RL; RP
	
given f ; T p; T rg.
When  = 0 the rich are not able to solve their collective action problem and will not make
a bribe o¤er. In the policy-making subgame, the legislator will take f ; T p; T rg as given and
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solve the program
V L;p [ ; T p; T r;  = 1;  = 0]  max
fRL;RP g
v
 
RL

+ (1  ) ((1  )yp + T p) ;
subject to the government budget constraint (2) and the policy vector f ; T p; T rg decided by
the president. The solution to this problem involves RP = 0 and
RL =  y   (1  )T p   T r: (9)
Given this, in the prior subgame the president sets the tax rate and transfers so as to
maximize
V P;p[ = 1;  = 0]  max
f ;T p;T rg
v
 
RP

+ (1  ) ((1  )yp + T p) ;
subject to the government budget constraint (2), the constraint that    , and the best
response of the legislator, i.e., RP = 0 and RL given by (9). Substituting for RP , this implies
that f ; T p; T rg will be chosen to maximize
v (0) + (1  ) ((1  )yp + T p) = (1  )Up;
i.e., to maximize the utility of poor citizens. Intuitively, with checks and balances, the legislator
will not allow the president to obtain any rents (instead grabbing all the rents himself). This
then induces the president to set zero rents for all politicians, which maximizes the utility of the
poor (recall that, so far, there is no bribing from the rich lobby). Consequently, in this case, the
utility of poor agents is maximized and is equal to
Up [ = 1;  = 0] =
(1   + ) y
1   > U
p [ = 0;  = ] : (10)
But the utility of the president is now lower than in the case without checks and balances, i.e.,
V P;p [ = 1;  = 0] = (1  ) (1   + ) y
1   < V
P;p [ = 0;  = ] ;
which implies that the president is strictly worse o¤ because of the presence of checks and
balances in the constitution.
Crucially, this advantage of checks and balances in terms of controlling the president is a
double-edged sword, because it also makes the president cheaper to buy as we will now see by
considering the case in which the rich lobby is organized. In particular, suppose now that  = 1
(as well as  = 1). Then the rich lobby will make bribe o¤ers
n
b^L; R^L; R^P
o
and
n
b^P ; ^ ; T^ p; T^ r
o
to the legislator and the president, respectively. For the politicians to accept these bribe o¤ers,
they must satisfy the participation constraints
V L;p

b^L; ^ ; T^ p; T^ r; R^L; R^P

 V L;p [ = 1;  = 0] ;
and
V P;p

b^P ; ^ ; T^ p; T^ r; R^L; R^P

 V P;p [ = 1;  = 0] :
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Consider rst the bribing of the legislator. Since none of the politicians get rents, the rich has
nothing to gain by bribing the legislator to change the allocation of rents. Thus b^L = 0.
Consider next bribes from the rich lobby to the president. As noted above, under checks
and balances, the president does not receive any rents and is thus relatively cheap to bribe. In
particular, the rich lobby can o¤er bribes to the president in exchange for less income redistri-
bution to the poor. Since when RP = 0 the marginal utility of rents (and thus of bribes) is
greater than the presidents marginal utility of transfers to the poor, it is benecial for the rich
lobby to pay a positive bribe to the president in return for less redistribution to the poor. As in
the case without checks and balances, without loss of any generality, let us focus on o¤ers that
have the minimal bribes from the rich lobby, which means that (among equivalent ones) we are
focusing on those solutions with T^ r = 0 . Taking this and the fact that RP = 0 into account,
the problem of the rich lobby can be written as
max
fb^P ;T^ p;^g
(1  ^) yr   b^
P

+
^ y   (1  ) T^ p

subject to (11)
v

b^P

+ (1  )

(1  ^)yp + T^ p

 (1  )

(1  )yp +  y
1  

T^ p  0
  ^ :
Analyzing the solution to this maximization problem enables us to establish the next proposi-
tion, which characterizes equilibrium bribes, policies and utility levels under checks and balances.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the constitution involves checks and balances (i.e.,  = 1). Then:
1. When  = 0 so that the rich lobby is not organized and there is no bribing, the equilibrium
involves  =  , RP = 0, RL = 0, T r = 0, and T p =  y= (1  ), and the utility of poor
agents is given by (10).
2. When  = 1 so that the rich lobby is organized and there is bribing, then there exists
 2 (0; 1) such that:
(a) If  > , then  =  , RP = 0, RL = 0, bP > 0, bL = 0, T p = 0, T r > 0, and the
utility of poor agents is given by (20).
(b) If  < , then  <  , RP = 0, RL = 0, bP > 0, bL = 0, T p > 0, T r  0, and the
utility of poor agents is given by (23).
Taking into account that the probability the rich can solve their collective action problem and
bribe politicians is q, we have that:
If  > , then the expected utility of the poor is given by
Up [ = 1] =
(1   + ) y   q y
1   : (12)
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If  < , then the expected utility of the poor is given by
Up [ = 1] =
(1   + ) y   q v(R)v0(R)
1   : (13)
Proof. Substituting for yp  (1  )y= (1  ) and yr  y=, (11) can be rewritten as
max
fb^P ;T^ p;^g
(1  ^) y

  b^
P

+
^ y   (1  ) T^ p

subject to
v

b^P

+ (1  )

(1  ^) (1  )y
1   + T^
p

 (1  )

(1   + ) y
1  

; (14)
T^ p  0, and   ^ , where (14) is the participation constraint of the president, ensuring that
he receives greater utility with bribery than he would do without. Denoting the multiplier on
(14) by 1, on the constraint that T^ p  0 by 2, and on the constraint that   ^ by 3, the
rst-order conditions are that the derivatives of the maximization problem with respect to b^P ,
T^ p and ^ must satisfy:
 1

+ 1v
0

b^P

= 0; (15)
 1  

+ 1 (1  ) + 2 = 0; (16)
and
 y

+
y

  1 (1  ) (1  )y
1     3 = 0: (17)
From (15) it follows that 1 > 0, implying that the participation constraint of the president,
(14), binds. From (17), and then (16), we get
3 =
(1  )y
1  

1  

  1 (1  )

=
(1  )y
1   2
Thus we have two cases to consider. Either 2; 3 > 0 or 2 = 3 = 0. Now using (15) to
eliminate 1 from (16), we nd that if

1  v
0

b^P

>
1
1   ; (18)
then 2; 3 > 0, which also implies T^ p = 0 and ^ =  . Conversely, if (18) does not hold, then
2 = 3 = 0 and T^ p > 0, ^ <  .
Next, if T^ p = 0 and ^ =  , then from constraint (14) holding as equality, the equilibrium
bribe from the rich lobby, b^P , is decreasing in , i.e., b^P = b^P () with b^P 0() < 0. This implies
that the left-hand side of (18) is increasing in  while the right-hand side does not depend on
. So a unique value of ,  2 (0; 1), is (implicitly) dened such that

1   v
0

b^P ()

=
1
1   : (19)
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If  >  so that politicians care su¢ ciently about rents and not much about the utility of the
poor, then we have T^ p = 0 and ^ =  . The utility of poor agents in this case is given by
Up [ = 1;  = 1] =
(1  ) (1  )y
1   : (20)
If, in contrast,  <  so that politicians care more about the utility of their group, then T^ p > 0
and ^ <  . In this case, equilibrium bribe is b^P = b such that
v0 (b) =
1  
(1  ) ; (21)
which in turn implies from (6) that b = R. From the participation constraint of the president,
(14), we obtain the equilibrium transfer to the poor as
T^ p =
y
1   (^(1  ) + ) 

(1  )v (R
) =
y
1   (^(1  ) + ) 
v (R)
v0 (R) (1  ) ; (22)
where the last equality follows from (6). Inserting for the transfers in the expression for the
income of the poor, the utility of poor agents in this case is given by
Up [ = 1;  = 1] =
(1   + ) y   v(R)v0(R)
1   : (23)
It is also straightforward to verify that in both regimes, the rich are strictly better o¤ when
paying bribes (which intuitively follows from the fact that the president is as well of and the
poor are worse o¤). Formally: when  > , the rich lobby is strictly better o¤ if  y > b^P ,
which is satised with (strict inequality) as b^P < R <  y. Next consider the case where  < .
In this case the net increase in the income of the rich relative to the case without bribing is
 b^P + (^(1  ) + )y  (1  ) T^ p > 0. Using (22) this reduces to v (R)  v0 (R) b^P > 0, and
since b^P = R and v is strictly concave, this is always satised, completing the proof.
The economic content of this proposition is simple. Checks and balances limit the possibility
that politicians divert public resources for personal rents. All else equal, this increases the utility
of poor voters. In particular, if the rich lobby is not organized and cannot bribe the president,
then the utility of poor agents is given by (10), which is the highest feasible utility that they
can obtain given the policy instruments. However, checks and balances also make the president
relatively cheap to bribe. Thus when the rich lobby is organized, it can e¤ectively bribe the
president to limit redistribution to the poor, reducing the utility of poor voters (both (20) and
(23) are necessarily less than (10)).
2.6 Elections
With no checks and balances in the constitution a president from the poor will always set the tax
rate at the maximum, o¤ering redistribution to the poor. Given the politician utility function
in (3), a president from the rich group would set the same tax rate as a president from the
poor, but would not redistribute to the poor. Therefore, the poor strictly prefer to vote for the
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poor candidate. In this case, as the legislature has no political power, the utility of the poor
is independent of from which income group the legislator originates. Thus without checks and
balances voting for a poor politician in the presidential election is a weakly dominant strategy
for poor citizens.
With checks and balances and no bribing, a president from the poor will set policy so as to
maximize the utility of the poor. If, on the other hand, there are bribes from the rich lobby, it
can be easily veried that a president from the rich group will again o¤er no redistribution to the
poor, whereas the president from the poor group, as we have seen in Proposition 2, sometimes
does. Moreover, the legislator will prevent the president from getting rents whichever income
group the legislator originates from. Thus with checks and balances as well, voting for a poor
politician in the presidential election is a weakly dominant strategy for poor citizens. In the rest
of this section, we also adopt the convention that they vote for poor candidates in the legislative
elections, though this has no bearing on the results.
2.7 Referendum and Equilibrium Checks and Balances
The more interesting voting stage in our model is the referendum on whether the constitution
should include checks and balances. This will depend on whether the expected utility of a poor
agent (before knowing whether the rich lobby is organized) is greater without checks and balances
as in Proposition 1 or with checks and balances as in Proposition 2. The next proposition answers
this question:
Proposition 3 1. Suppose that  > . Then the constitution will involve no checks and
balances, i.e.,  = 0, if
q >
R
 y
; (24)
and it will involve checks and balances if the converse inequality holds.
2. Suppose that  < . Then the constitution will involve no checks and balances, i.e.,
 = 1, if
q >
v0 (R)R
v (R)
; (25)
and it will involve checks and balances if the converse inequality holds.
In both cases, a greater q (a greater likelihood of the rich lobby being organized) makes a
constitution without checks and balances more likely (in the sense that the set of parameters for
which the constitution does not involve checks and balances is larger).
Proof. An individual from the poor income group (strictly) prefers a constitution without
checks and balances when Up [ = 0] > Up [ = 1], and given our focus on voting using weakly
undominated strategies, the referendum will lead to the outcome preferred by the poor majority.
Using (7) and (12), we then obtain part 1. Using (7) and (13), we obtain part 2. The last part
of the proposition directly follows from parts 1 and 2.
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This proposition is the main result of the paper. First, it shows that voters may rationally
choose no checks and balances. They realize that checks and balances imply lower politician
rents (in fact, in our simple model no rents). However, they also understand that this makes
politicians cheaper to buyfor the rich lobby. Thus when they expect it to be likely that the
rich lobby can bribe the president, they may prefer a constitution without checks and balances
as a way of making the president too expensive for the rich lobby to buy. We believe that this
result, in a stylized way, captures the main reason why, in many weakly-institutionalized polities
(where the rich lobby can successfully bribe politicians or inuence policies using non-electoral
means), voters are willing to put up with strong leaders pursuing their own agendas, provided
that they are also expected to adopt redistributive policies. In fact, in many such cases they are
even willing to remove several constitutional checks on such politicians.
Second, for this same intuitive reasons, the proposition also shows that when the probability
q that the rich lobby will be organized to bribe and inuence politicians is greater, a constitution
without checks and balances is more likely to be preferred by the poor majority. In fact, a rst
corollary to Proposition 3 is that:
Corollary 1 When q = 1, so that the rich are always able to bribe politicians, then the consti-
tution will never include checks and balances.
Proof. This follows by noting that both (24) and (25) hold when q = 1 (since R <  y
because of the Inada conditions we imposed, and v0 (R)R < v (R) due to the strict concavity
of v).
The next corollary to Proposition 3 emphasizes that the only reason why poor voters may
support a constitution without checks and balances is political corruption.
Corollary 2 If q = 0, so that the rich are never able to bribe politicians, then the constitution
will always include checks and balances.
Proof. This immediately follows by noting that neither (24) nor (25) will hold when q = 0.
The reasoning of Proposition 3 highlights that voters are willing to put up with politician
rents (resulting from the lack of checks and balances) in return for redistribution. The next
corollary formalizes this notion by showing that (when  > ) a constitution without checks
and balances is more likely when potential taxes are higher.
Corollary 3 Suppose q 2 (0; 1). When  > , a constitution without checks and balances is
more likely when  is higher (when potential taxes are higher). (When  < ,  has no e¤ect
on the choice of checks and balances in the constitution).
Proof. This result directly follows by noting when  >  the right-hand side of (24) is
decreasing in  (and when  <  (25) does not contain ).
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One application of this corollary is to natural resource abundant weakly-institutionalized
countries. Natural resource abundance makes it easier to impose higher taxes (or nationalize
production). In consequence, it may be voters in resource-abundant countries, such as many
Latin American ones, that nd it particularly attractive to remove checks and balances from
the constitution.
When  <  (which implies that politicians put su¢ ciently large weight on the utility of
the poor), the comparison of constitutions with and without checks and balances is independent
of potential taxes. This is because of the quasi-linear utility function in (3), which implies that
the equilibrium level of bribes is independent of the level of potential taxes when  < .
Proposition 3 also shows that when  >  a constitution without checks and balances is
more likely when (equilibrium) politician rents given by R are low. Even though R is an
endogenous object in this economy, it is simply determined by the v function and  (as shown
by equation (6)).13 (When  < , lower rents R have an ambiguous e¤ect on the choice of
constitution, the reason being that lower rents increases the utility of the poor both in the case
where the constitution contains checks and balances and in the case where it does not).
It is also useful to note that the value of q that is relevant both for Proposition 3 and these
corollaries is the probability of the rich lobby being organized when there is checks and balances,
since the lobby is ine¤ective without checks and balances. This also means that all of our results
apply without any modication if the probability of the lobby being organized was greater, say
q^ > q, without checks and balances, and thus the assumption that the same probability applies
in both regimes is simply adopted to reduce notation.
The political power of the rich lobby rests on its ability to overcome the collective action
problem of its members so as to be able to inuence policy through non-electoral means. The
next corollary shows, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, that a better ability to overcome the
collective action problem may in fact reduce the political power and utility of the rich. To see
this, dene q as the value of q that solves (24) with equality when  >  and as the q that
solves (25) with equality when  < .
Corollary 4 The expected utility of the rich as a function of q is increasing in q for q 2 [0; q);
jumps down in q at q = q; and is constant in q for q 2 [q; 1].
Proof. For q < q, it follows from (24) and (25) that the constitution will always involve
checks and balances. The expected utility of the rich when the constitution includes checks and
balances is given by
U r [ = 1] = (1  q)(1  ) y

+ q
 
(1  ^) y

  b^
P

+
^ y   (1  ) T^ p

!
=
(1  ) y

+
qb^P

0@(1  )v

b^P

(1  ) b^P   1
1A ;
13Another interesting implication of this kind of reasoning is that voters may nd it in their own interest to
elect wealthy individuals as politicians, as these may be more di¢ cult to inuence by bribing.
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where the second line follows by inserting for T^ p from (14) always holding as equality.
When  >  we use (19) to obtain
U r [ = 1] =
(1  ) y

+
qb^P

0@ (1  )v

b^P

(1  )v0

b^P ()

b^P
  1
1A ;
which is increasing in q for  >  (since in this case b^P  b^P () which implies that v

b^P

>
v0

b^P ()

b^P ).
When  <  we use (21) to obtain
U r [ = 1] =
(1  ) y

+
qR


v (R)
v0 (R)R
  1

;
which is also increasing in q.
For q > q, it follows from (24) and (25) that the constitution will never involve checks and
balances, in which case the utility of the rich is given by
U r [ = 0] =
(1  ) y

;
which is independent of q. Comparing U r [ = 0] with U r [ = 1] we see that the latter always
exceeds the former, and the corollary follows.
Intuitively, with checks and balances, the utility of the rich (lobby) is monotone increasing
in q their ability to bribe politicians. But when q exceeds q, this triggers the lifting of the
checks and balances, increasing redistribution and presidential rents, and making the rich worse
o¤.
In sum, our baseline model shows that poor voters, who make up the majority and would
like to see income redistribution, may prefer a constitution without checks and balances because
checks and balances, by reducing politician rents, make them cheaper to buyfor the rich lobby.
Our analysis also shows that a constitution without checks and balances is more likely when the
rich are more likely to solve the collective action problem and successfully bribe politicians, and
when potential taxes are higher, making redistribution more valuable to the poor.
2.8 The Judiciary
We now extend the model so that under checks and balances there is an independent judiciary
and show that this does not a¤ect the main insights presented so far, but the quality of the
judiciary increases the likelihood that checks and balances will emerge in equilibrium.14
Checks and balances typically gives the judiciary an independent role, and thus the judiciary
may prevent illegal bribing. In particular, we assume that when it becomes common knowledge
whether the rich are able to solve their collective action problem and make bribe o¤ers, it also
14The model in this subsection can be viewed as an example of a framework with multiple veto players along the
lines of Diermeier and Myerson (1999). This class of models is discussed in greater detail in the online appendix.
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becomes common knowledge whether the judiciary will be able to discover such bribing. We
assume that the judiciary is able to do so with probability s 2 [0; 1]. When the judiciary can
clamp down on bribing, we assume that it is too costly for the rich to undertake it (given that
the judiciary cannot be bribed).
Consider rst the case where the judiciary is incorruptible. The only situation that di¤ers
from the model above is when  = 1 and  = 1, i.e. when there is checks and balances and the
rich are able to a¤ect policy through bribing. Now this is no longer a su¢ cient condition for
bribing to take place, since there is a probability s we are in a case where bribing is prevented
by the judiciary. It immediately follows that the probability of bribing, which was q in the
previous model, is now reduced to (1  s)q. This case can thus be summarized in the following
proposition (proof in text).
Proposition 4 Suppose the judiciary is incorruptible. Then all of the results in Proposition 3
and the subsequent corollaries hold in the current model (with (1  s)q replacing q).
The main noteworthy implication of this proposition is that low quality of judicial institutions
(low s) makes checks and balances less likely. Thus when the judicial institutions are weak voters
do not see it in their own interest to have a constitution that places constraints on politicians.
Judicial institutions that provide weak control of the behavior of the rich lobby then encourage
the emergence of political institutions that impose only weak controls on the president.
From this proposition it is also clear that if the judicial system were perfect in the sense that
it always discovered bribing (s = 1) and were also incorruptible, then voters would always prefer
a constitution with checks and balances (because the rich lobby would never be able to inuence
policy under such a constitution). When the judiciary can also be bribed, however, the picture
is di¤erent. To see this consider the case where bribing will always be discovered but where the
rich (when they solve their collective action problem) can also bribe the judiciary. We assume
that the appointed judiciary J is from the poor and we denote the bribe to the judiciary by
bJ  0.15 In contrast to the case in the basic model, the rich will now need to bribe both the
president and the judiciary. Thus the problem of the rich lobby can be written as
max
fb^P ;b^J ;T^ p;^g
(1  ^) y

  b^
P + b^J

+
^ y   (1  ) T^ p

subject to (26)
v

b^P

+ (1  )

(1  ^) (1  )y
1   + T^
p

 (1  )

(1   + ) y
1  

;
v

b^J

+ (1  )

(1  ^) (1  )y
1   + T^
p

 (1  )

(1   + ) y
1  

;
T^ p  0, and   ^ . Characterizing the solution to the maximization problem leads to the
following proposition:
15 If the judiciary is from the rich we are back in exactly the same model as without an independent judiciary.
The reason for this is that under checks and balances the rich get a higher utility with bribing than without, and
thus the judiciary will have a higher utility not clamping down on bribing. In other words, when the rich can
bribe the participation constraint of the judiciary is thus fullled even with b^J = 0.
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Proposition 5 Consider the case where bribing will always be discovered by the judiciary and
the judiciary can be bribed. Then there exists  >  such that all of the results in Proposition
3 hold in the current model, except that  replaces .
Proof. Denoting the multipliers on the four constraints in (26) by 1, 2, 3 and 4, the
rst-order conditions with respect to b^P , b^J , T^ p and ^ are:
 1

+ 1v
0

b^P

= 0; (27)
 1

+ 2v
0

b^J

= 0; (28)
 (1  )

+ (1 + 2) (1  ) + 3 = 0; (29)
and
 y

+
y

  (1 + 2) (1  ) (1  )y
1     4 = 0: (30)
From (27) and (28) it follows that the participation constraints of the president and judiciary
hold with equality. Moreover, both participation constraints holding as equality implies that
b^L = b^J , and this in turn implies 1 = 2. From (29) and (30) we then get 4 = 3(1 )y=(1 ).
Solving for 1 from (27) and inserting in (29), we nd that 3; 4 > 0 and thus T^ p = 0 and
^ =  if

1  v
0

b^P

>
2
1   : (31)
The participation constraint of the president also implies that when T^ p = 0 and ^ =  , b^P must
be decreasing in , i.e., b^P = b^P () with b^P 0() < 0. Thus the left-hand side of (31) is increasing
in , while the right-hand side does not depend on . The following equation thus implicitly
denes a unique value of , , such that

1   v
0

b^P ()

=
2
1   : (32)
Note from (32) that the only change from equation (19) in the basic model is that the right-hand
side of (32) is twice the right-hand side of (19). This immediately implies  > .
It is then straightforward to see that when  >  the condition for the poor to prefer no
checks and balances is identical to the case where  >  above. When  <  the condition
is also the same as when  <  above, but with b replaced by b < b such that
v0(b) =
2(1  )
 (1  ) : (33)
Note also that, with the exception of Corollary 1, all of the corollaries above hold. The reason
Corollary 1 need not hold is because when  <  the condition for no checks and balances
in the constitution is given by q > v0 (b)R=v (b) (where b is given by (33) in the proof of
Proposition 5), which in contrast to the case above need not hold when q = 1. The intuition
for this is that the bribing solution is now more favorable for the poor compared to in the case
above, as the solution involves more income redistribution and lower bribes.
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2.9 Income inequality
In the above model income inequality did not a¤ect the choice of the poor to remove checks
and balances from the constitution or not. This is a result of our simple utility function. We
now explore the solution of the basic model when the utility function of politicians is no longer
quasi-linear. In particular, suppose that the utility function of a politician j from income group
i 2 fp; rg is given by
V j;i =
 
Rj + bj + r
  
U i
1 
; (34)
where  2 (0; 1), and r > 0 denotes the ego rents of becoming an elected politician. These ego
rents may also be interpreted as the wage of a politician. With r > 0 the utility function is
dened and well behaved also in cases where Rj + bj = 0.
To facilitate comparison with the model above that does not include ego rents, we simplify by
focusing on the case where r ! 0, so that for simplicity the ego rent term vanishes. Nevertheless,
the presence of this vanishing term implies that even when Rj = bj = 0 the utility function has
standard properties. We show the solution in this case and also in the slightly more complicated
case when r can take any value in the online appendix.
We there reach the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Let H  1 + and suppose that r ! 0. Then:
1. When  > H the constitution will always involve checks and balances.
2. When  < H then the constitution will involve no checks and balances if
q >
 (1   + )

; (35)
and it will involve checks and balances if the converse inequality holds.
Proof. See the online appendix.
As in the basic model a higher q and a higher  makes it more likely that checks and balances
are removed from the constitution. But importantly, we can also see that because the right-hand
side of (35) is decreasing in , checks and balances are more likely with greater inequality, which
is stated in the next corollary.
Corollary 5 A constitution without checks and balances is more likely when  is greater (when
income inequality is higher).
Intuitively, without checks and balances the president now appropriates greater rents when
inequality is higher (with quasi-linearity these rents did not depend on inequality). The more
general utility function considered here then implies that the extent of redistribution increases
with inequality, and this raises the cost to the poor of bribes by the rich lobby, and thus
encourages the removal of checks and balances when there is more inequality.
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2.10 Robustness
The main insight we have emphasized so far is that checks and balances may be costly for
the poor majority because, by reducing the presidents rents, they make him more amenable to
lobbying and bribery by an organized rich lobby. In the online appendix, we show that this main
insight is robust under a variety of di¤erent modeling assumptions. We rst consider another
model of separation of powers, along the lines of Diermeier and Myerson (1999) and Tsebelis
(2002), where checks and balances give the legislature veto power over all dimensions of policy.
We show that all of the results from our baseline model apply for this model as well.
We also study an alternative model of separation of powers along the lines of Persson,
Roland and Tabellinis (1997, 2000) approach, which assumes that, under separation of powers,
the president decides the tax rate and the legislature makes the spending decisions. We again
show that all of our main results generalize to this case. In addition, we show that now, even
with quasi-linear utility function, checks and balances are more likely to be removed when
income inequality is high. This is because in this model, even with checks and balances, there
are equilibrium rents, now captured by the legislator, and as a consequence, the president may
choose a tax rate less than the maximum. When the rich lobby is organized, the president may
respond to bribes by choosing redistribution away from the poor to the rich rather than the
other way around. As a result, redistribution towards the poor without checks and balances
becomes more valuable to the poor when inequality is high, and this encourages the removal of
checks and balances with high inequality.
Finally, we also use this alternative model of separation of powers to study how including
political minorities (representatives of the rich) in the legislature a¤ects the results. The main
result is the following paradoxical nding: greater power sharing in the legislature can backre
and lead to an equilibrium with fewer checks on the president. Thus when the rich are politi-
cally powerful in parliament their power may end up being stripped o¤ through changes in the
constitution.
3 Some Evidence
In this section we provide case study and econometric evidence to support the ideas proposed in
this paper. Neither type of evidence precisely pinpoints the mechanism underlying the disman-
tling of checks and balances and support for strongmanpoliticians in Latin America, but they
all paint a picture where popular support for such measures comes from a widespread view that
politics is dominated by a traditional elite or oligarchy,a phenomenon made possible by this
elites control over the legislature and sometimes over the presidents. Notably, and perhaps at
rst paradoxically, the solution to this is viewed by the protagonists as strengthening the state
and the presidency, exactly as in our model (though of course without the formal reasoning in
our model). The econometric evidence also shows that these concerns and the resulting political
reactions tend to be stronger in countries with weaker democracies.
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A related question is why this backlash favoring presidential power has taken place in Latin
America and starting in the late 1990s and coming to a head in the 2000s. Though we do not
have a precise answer to this question, we suspect it is related (1) to the reality that politics in
many Latin American countries has been dominated by traditional elites through corruption and
other non-electoral means, underpinning the very high levels of economic inequality in much of
the region, and (2) to the collapse of these non- or quasi-democratic regimes in several countries
in the 1990s, opening the way to electoral competition with stronger appeals to the fundamental
concerns of the majority of voters in these countries.16
3.1 Case Study Evidence
The mechanisms that underlay our results can be supported by examining what the protagonists
themselves say as well as the conventional wisdom in the secondary academic literature on
Latin American politics, particularly on populism. In this subsection we provide an overview
of the academic literature focusing on Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, three countries that
exemplify the mechanism we propose and that have undergone referenda on dismantling checks
on presidential power from the legislature.17 In each case, there is considerable evidence that
the rhetoric of the presidents seeking greater powers and the support they ultimately received
was based on the perception that the oligarchywas wielding disproportionate political power,
largely because of its ability to control and buy politicians at all levels of government. In all
three cases, the politics of betrayal (or fear of such betrayal) was crucial to these dynamics
as previous presidents brought to power to change politics-as-usual either backtracked or where
unsuccessful.
The academic literature depicts the changes we have been analyzing as part of Latin Amer-
ican populism. Though there is no convention about the exact denition of populism, existing
studies all portray populism in very similar ways. For example, Levitsky and Roberts (2011,
p. 6) dene it as the top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic
16For example, though Ecuador came out of military rule in 1979 and for the rst time illiterate citizens could
also vote, politics was at the time still controlled by the traditional elite, especially via the clientelistic party
system. It took time for the previously disenfranchised to organize with their rst success being the election of
Abdalá Bucaram in 1996. But as we explain below, it did not lead to signicant changes in policy, fueling concerns
of the politics of betrayaland setting the scene for Correas presidency as we explain below. The political history
of Bolivia is similar with the military leaving even later, in 1982. In Venezuela, the military left in 1958 but were
replaced by a two-party partyarchy. The political barriers to entry that the system posed were eroded only in
the 1980s as a result of economic crisis and mounting corruption scandals.
17The other two countries that have experienced similar major removals of congressional checks against pres-
idential powers since the late 1980s are Peru and Nicaragua. In Peru, President Alberto Fujimori suspended
the sitting congress by issuing Decree 25418 in 1992, and oversaw new elections in which his supporters gained
a majority in the congress. They proceeded to rewrite the constitution moving from a bicameral to a unicam-
eral legislature, weakening the congress and judicial independence, and strengthening presidential powers. These
changes were popularly approved by a referendum (Mauceri, 2006). In Nicaragua, the process started with the
1987 Sandinista constitution, which strengthened presidential powers, for example by moving from bicameral to
unicameral legislature. The constitution was amended again in 1995 during the Violeta Chamorra government
to strengthen the power of the legislature, for instance, allowing it to over-ride presidential decrees by a simple
majority. Presidential powers were increased again under Daniel Ortega, in 2009, allowing him to run again for
presidency in 2011.
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leaders who challenge established political or economic elites on behalf of an ill-dened pueblo,
or the people. Similarly De la Torre (2010, p. viii) argues Populist leaders have constructed
politics as a ... confrontation ... between the people and the oligarchyand populism is a ...
worldview ... that perceives history as a Manichean struggle between ... [the] common interest
of the citizens ... [and] a conspiring elite. Wholesale institutional change ... is required in
order to restore the will of the people (Hawkins, 2010, p. 5). This literature notes the cor-
relation between the rise of populist leaders such as Chávez in Venezuela, Correa in Ecuador,
and Morales in Bolivia, but it has not proposed any precise mechanism linking populism as a
political strategy to the dismantling of checks and balances, and it does not clarify why citizens
who vote for populist leaders would not be equally interested in using checks and balances to
stop them extracting rents than any other type of leader.
The survey evidence we present in the next subsection also shows that a majority of citizens
in many Latin American societies believe that elite control of politics is a major obstacle to
progress in their country.
Ecuador Democracy returned to Ecuador in 1979 after the withdrawal of the military from
politics. The following period degenerated into political instability with a pattern emerging of
presidents running for power on redistributive populistplatforms, from which they deviated
after assuming power, only to be thrown from power by popular uprisings which were then
ratied in some way. The most recent episodes feature the election of Abdalá Bucaram in 1996
on a redistributive platform aimed at reversing Washington consensustype policies. Once in
power Bucaram abandoned the policies and imposed scal retrenchment and was forced from
o¢ ce within one year by street demonstrations. He was followed by Jamil Mahuad, elected in
1998 and forced from o¢ ce by a joint civilian-military coup in 2000, partially in response to
the dollarization of the economy and the bailing out of the banking system which from the
point of view of ordinary citizens ... looked like a generous bailout of predatory nanciers
(Conaghan, 2012, p. 263 ). Next was Lino Gutiérrez, who took part in the coup and was elected
as president on a left-wing platform, only to be forced from power by a popular uprising in 2005
after also reneging on his agenda. In the transitional government that replaced Gutiérrez, a
young economist, Rafael Correa, got the job as minister of nance. He used his position as a
platform to attack the neoliberaleconomic policies of his predecessors and launched a bid for
the presidential election in 2006. Correas campaign focused on
two overarching, interrelated themes: (1) the degeneration of state institutions
and the moral bankruptcy of the political class and (2) the disintegration of the
nation/homeland (patria) as a result of the elite-imposed economic policies that
sacriced the public interest in favor of private gain. In Correas imagery, Ecuador
was a country kidnapped, a nation held hostage by political and economic elites
... the state was an edice of domination controlled by the traditional parties, the
partidocracia (the partyarchy)(Conaghan, 2012, p. 265).
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Correas vision based on the control of the political system by the partidocracia, the elite,
or the oligarchywas crucial to his broader rhetoric. So he advised supporters:
Lets not be naive ... We won the elections, but not power. Power is controlled
by economic interests, the banks, the partidocracia, and the media connected to the
banks.(Conaghan, 2008, p. 47)
During the campaign Correa gambled on his power to re-write the constitution. His party
Movimiento Patria Altiva y Soberana (Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Movement PAIS) did
not run any candidates for congress. Nevertheless after taking o¢ ce in January 2007 by April, he
forced through a referendum on whether to hold a constitutional convention. 82% of people voted
in favor. In elections held that September his party took 80 of the 130 seats in the convention,
and its rst action was to dissolve the sitting congress, a hotbed of opposition. The convention
sat until July 2008, and Not surprisingly, the institutional design of the new constitution
strengthened the executive branch. It provided the president with various pathways to manage
Ecuadors chronic problem of executive-legislative stalemate. For example, the president can
convoke referenda on virtually any issue, thus trumping legislative opponents. Another weapon
... is the power to dissolve the legislative and call new elections once during his term of o¢ ce.
The constitution also stripped the legislative assembly of powers with respect to appointments in
the judicial and executive branch ... The capstone of presidential power in the new constitution
is the provision allowing the president to run for an additional consecutive terms of four years:
this reversed Ecuadors previous practice(Conaghan, 2012, p. 271). The new constitution was
approved by 64% of the voters in September 2008.
What was the consequences of this rebalancing of political power? A signicant one for this
paper is described by Conaghan (2012, p. 274): the Correa administration took actions to
eliminate or signicantly eclipse the inuence of interest groups. In some cases this involved
reasserting central government control over public entities that had been controlled by interest
groups or rejigging the composition of their boards. But overall, the entire project was driven
by the notion that Ecuadorian politics was controlled by the elite or the oligarchywhose power
had to be broken. As Conaghan and de la Torre (2008, p. 278) put it, his view was that
political opponents are not simply wrong-headed, misguided, or misinformed;
they are corrupt and immortal representatives of the privileged, la oligarquia.
To understand the motivation behind the dismantling of checks and balances and strength-
ening of presidential powers, it is perhaps even more instructive to study the speeches of Rafael
Correa since he assumed power in Ecuador. No doubt his speeches contain large amounts of
rhetoric, yet presumably this rhetoric strikes a chord with the Ecuadorian voters which is why
he uses it. The way he analyzes the problems of Ecuadorian politics in these speeches is very
consistent and uses a recurrent set of concepts and images. For example, on February 28 2007
he made a signicant speech, proposing a referendum for a constitutional assembly. He began:
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We said we were going to transform the fatherland in the citizens revolution,
democratic, constitutional ... but revolutionary, without getting entangled in the
old structures, without falling into the hands of those with the traditional power,
without accepting that the fatherland has particular owners. The fatherland is for
everyone without lies with absolute transparency(Correa, 2007a, p. 2)
The speech argues that the motivation for the new constitution is to break the capture by
elites over political institutions, including, most notably, the presidency. He continues, now
referring to the same elite as the maas,and clearly articulating the notion that the objective
is to strengthen the (his) presidency in order to reduce the de facto power of the elite:
a new constitution is required . . . to extract the country from the economic,
political and social blockade, to which the maas who have always dominated, have
condemned this country. . . of course today there are still other de facto powers and
we are seeing them, these are powers that believe that they are owners of regions
and the country, owners of truth, owners of the president of the republic.(Correa,
2007a, p. 5)
On March 15, 2007, Correa addressed congress on the topic of the functioning of the electoral
system. He used this as a further opportunity to advance his diagnosis of the political problems
of the country and the need for constitutional change. He rejected the notion that the country
had become ungovernable because of the extent of popular participation and emphasized that
the government was not going to be bribed into abandoning its principles, in the process, clearly
articulating the idea that the threat was for the elite to use its nancial power to bribe all level
governments and politicians:
this government is not submissive, its not for sale and it doesnt know, as
someone said a long time ago the geometry of the bent knee,18... Maybe thats
why they dont understand who we are. They try to nd the man with the bag . . . in
the gure . . . of the vicepresident of the republic; they judge that way because there
is a saying each criminal judges based on their own condition19 (Correa, 2007b, p.
11).
Here the bag, in Spanish el maletín, refers to a bag of money used to bribe politicians.
Contrary to the old system of political institutions, Correa is arguing that they will not be
bought by the elite. Instead the new constitution is going to help change the state of a¤airs,
which again very much echoes some of the ideas in our model: We are going to disassemble
the maa apparatus, we are going to disassemble institutionalized corruption, we are going to
18By this last phrase (la geometría de la rodilla doblada), he means the government will not be begging on
your knees to the elites.
19 In Spanish cada ladrón juzga por su condición meaning that criminals except everyone else to behave
like they do.
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nish the delusion of power of the same people that have condemned to misery our people. We
are going to end the concessions that the oligarchy has given to their friends at the expense of
millions of human beings. . . We are going to disassemble the apparatus with which they are
opposing the emergency health plan maybe because they dont see in it the opportunity to steal
the money of the state.(Correa, 2007b, p. 13)
Correa continually relates the capture of institutions by the elite to the pre-existing structure
of institutions, particularly the constitution of 1998. On July 25, 2008, Correa addressed the
closing session of the Constitutional Assembly noting: Lets not forget that the 98 constitution
was never never brought forward for the consideration of the people, and that the ones who
dominated that constitution are now the ones leading the campaign for the no(Correa, 2008a,
p. 21). The new constitution was di¤erent and was going to be democratically ratied, but
it nevertheless dismantled checks and balances. In a very telling passage of the same speech
on July 25, Correa noted This is the constitution of the 21st century . . . the title of supreme
has been eliminated from the di¤erent institutions, the Supreme Court of justice, here the only
one which is supreme is the Ecuadorian people, on it depends all the decisions(Correa, 2008a,
p. 23-23). No court was to be Supremeanymore or to block the will of the people working
through the president.
After the new constitution had been proposed, it had to be ratied by a plebiscite. Correa
campaigned vigorously for a yes vote, arguing: We didnt make concessions with the par-
tidocracia. We summoned a constitutional assembly in our rst act of government and now
we have a new political charter for the country, which totally breaks with the regime of perks
and privileges consecrated in the 1998 Constitution.Correa goes on to emphasize that the new
constitution is not authoritarian or one of hyper-presidentialism,but one which attempts to
make the state (and in particular, the president) stronger and which gives it the capacity to
implement policies for the development of the nation (Correa, 2008b, p. 10). Confronting this
project are powerful enemies, groups who, as we have seen, have in a stubborn and shameless
way lied without scruples . . . so they dont lose their privileges, their spaces ... We have con-
fronted the big media power which is now taking the place of the ruined partidocracia, this is
the direct voice of the powerful the instrument in the service of the bastards interest(p. 13)
So according to Correa what was necessary was:
a new social model, based on principles of solidarity, justice and welfare for
everyone; or more of the same, more of the same thing that we have had until
very recently, meaning: the law of everything for me, nothing for the rest, of the
corruption, the law of the strongest, the law of the connected, the predominance of
the power groups who have controlled everything, the dominance of the owners of
this country; of the vanity of the caciques, the abuse, justice only for the ones with
the poncho;20 of the dominance of the corrupt bankers.(Correa, 2008b, p. 15)
20Here the ones with the poncho are the patrimonial rural elites with the poncho signifying the attire of a
landed gentry.
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Summing up the importance of ratifying the constitution, Correa articulated the notion
that the dominant elite in Ecuador was able to control politics by its control of all levels of
governments, including the presidency and the legislature, and demanded greater powers for the
state and the president in order to change things, ideas that echo the key components of our
model. The picture that emerges both from Correas own political platform and his explanation
for it and the analysis of political scientists and students of Ecuadorian politics is thus fairly close
to the mechanisms which are central to our model, even though, to the best of our knowledge,
nobody has articulated it as exactly in our model.
Venezuela The roots of the rise to power of Hugo Chávez after 1999 have many similarities
with the Ecuadorian case. The rst is an oligarchic party system in the case of the punto
jo system in Venezuela, named after the pact of 1958 between the two major parties, AD
(Acción Democrática) and COPEI (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente)
to share and rotate power. Behind the elites of the political parties were a group of economic
elites known as the twelve apostles(Di John, 2009, p. 212). Coppedge (1994) refers to the
system as a partyarchynoting that Venezuelans themselves called it a partidocracia, exactly
the same word used so pejoratively in Ecuador by Correa (see also Crisp, 2000). The second
is the experience of new forces coming to power with alternative platforms and then changing
their minds once in power. In Venezuela this process was manifested in the presidency of Carlos
Andrés Perez who implemented free market reforms after being elected on a completely di¤erent
platform. In 1992 he faced a military coup masterminded by Chávez and a group of military
o¢ cers under the banner of the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200. Though the coup
failed, the o¢ cers were released from prison by Perezs successor Rafael Caldera.
Chávez was rst elected president in 1998 and thereafter, like Correa, he focused on the
process of getting the constitution re-written. We noted some of the important changes away
from checks and balances in Venezuela in the Introduction. In addition, there was also a move-
ment away from the use of super-majorities (also common in all cases) so that, for example,
future constitutional changes can be approved by a simple majority of the legislature. Also
signicant was the fact that the legislature could grant by a majority almost unlimited decree
powers to the president, a feature which has seen heavy use. These powers turned out to be
signicant in many ways. For example in 2004 the National Assembly passed a law expanding
the size of the Supreme Court from 20 to 32 members and making it possible to ratify the ap-
pointment of new judges with a simple majority. 5 justices resigned in protest allowing Chávez
to nominate 17 new justices (Castaldi, 2006).
The rhetoric which Chávez used to argue in favor of the constitutional reform was very
similar to that used by Correa. As he himself put it the problem was:21
how to break with the past, how to overcome this type of democracy that only
21See also Hawkins (2010, Chapter 3) for many similar examples.
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responds to the interests of the oligarchical sectors; how to get rid of the corruption
(quoted in Wilpert, 2003)
Chávezs arguments were persuasive because ordinary people viewed the Venezuelan elite as
a corrupt cogollo (big wigs) that had privatized the state, looted the nations wealth and abused
the people . . . The people have been betrayed by their leaders and democracy has become a
façade behind which an elite had used the state for its own advantageCoronil (1997, p. 378).
Unlike the much sparser academic literature on either Ecuador or Bolivia, that on Venezuela
has developed more explicit hypotheses about the rise of Chávez and the political success of his
movement (see Hawkins, 2010 Chapter 5 and Seawright, 2012 Chapter 1). The main ideas in this
literature are that Chávez triumphed because of (1) economic decline (the so-called economic
voting hypothesis); (2) a rise in oil prices which facilitated his redistributive platform; (3) the
corruption of the pre-existing political parties, the hypothesis favored by both Hawkins and
Seawright. Hawkins (2010, p. 6), for example, sums up his argument on the importance of
corruption of pre-existing political parties by stating populist movements become successful
when there is a widespread failure of government to implement rights of citizenship, particularly
the rule of law, that allows citizens to characterize their governments as corrupt. Though this
latter idea is in the spirit of our analysis, neither scholar provides a specic mechanism as to
why concern for corruption with pre-existing political elites would induce voters to support the
removal of checks and balances. Indeed the conventional wisdom in political economy would
suggest the opposite course of action.
Though political scientists have attempted to develop rational theories of Chavismo, there
are many who remain ba­ ed by the whole phenomenon. For example Krauze (2009, p. 10)
concludes Chávez does not act like the president of Venezuela; he acts like its owner. He
is the proprietor of his public o¢ ce, the CEO of state enterprises that answer to no laws of
transparency and accountability, the big and indiscriminate spender of oil revenues (between
1999 and 2008 he spent, on average, $122 million per day), the supreme leader of a Legislative
Assembly and Tribunal of Justice that is supposed to serve as a check and a balance. The
model of this paper can help explain why the majority of voters in Venezuela are prepared to
support such a situation. The fact that Chávez acts as the ownerof Venezuela and engages
in a foreign policy which does little for most Venezuelans corresponds to a form of (signicant)
rents conceded by voters to Chávez in order to get the policies they want in other dimensions.
Bolivia The nal case we briey discuss, which also highlights several ideas developed in our
model, is Bolivia. An important aspect of Bolivian politics over the last decade, left out of our
model, is the rise of indigenous politics. Evo Morales, the leader of the MAS party (Movimiento
Al Socialismo  Movement Towards Socialism) was elected president for the rst time in De-
cember 2005. His government was elected to put into practice what other governments had
decided or accepted ... The political failure to put these pacts into practice led to a loss of
legitimacy among the parties ... such as Poder Democrático Social (Podemos...). For a large
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section of voters, Podemos came to personify the traditional political party-game in which a
series of formations take turns at being in power and sharing out posts: the so-called democ-
racy by agreement(Aguirre and Moreno, 2006). Thus, as discussed above, Bolivia also shares
the important legacy of politics of betrayalwith Ecuador and Venezuela, having also seen a
president promising change entirely fail at delivering it. Moreover, like these other cases popular
revolt forced presidents in the Bolivian case, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 from power
in the period leading up to the dismantling of checks and balances.
Like Correa and Chávez, Morales came to power set on re-writing the constitution and creat-
ing a constitutional assembly was also one of his rst acts. In this assembly MAS had a majority
but not the 2/3 representation required to completely dominate the process (a di¤erence with
the other cases). The re-writing the constitution was justied by Morales in similar ways to that
of Correa and Chávez. De la Torre (2010, p. 119) notes that the perception that democracy in
Bolivia had been captured by white elites could be seen by the fact that Aymara leaders refer to
Bolivias representative democracy as qaracracia, a term that combines qara (plucked,bare
or hairless in Aymara and Quechua, meaning white person) with democracia. The new
constitution, ratied by a plebiscite in January 2009, brought about sweeping changes to the
Bolivian state that strengthened executive authority and undermined horizontal accountability
(Madrid, 2012, p. 252). In addition to the change in the presidential term limit to allow for
two terms (MAS wanted permanent re-election but could not get it into the constitution), these
changes included getting rid of supermajorities on the conrmation of government appointees
such as ombudsman, comptroller general and the National Election Court. The changes en-
shrined in the constitution soon led to further reductions in checks and balances; for instance in
early 2010 a law was passed authorizing Morales to appoint 5 Supreme Court justices, 10 Con-
stitutional Tribunal judges and 3 members of the Judicial Council, none of which would have
been possible under the old constitution. Madrid concludes his analysis (2012, pp. 239-240)
Although the MAS has helped boost political participation and increase mass satisfaction with
democracy ... it has ... undermined democratic checks and balances.
The evidence suggests that these changes have strengthened peoples condence in democracy
rather than undermined them. In the Latinobarómetro surveys the proportion of people who
were satised or very satised with democracy in Bolivia rose from 24% in 2005 to 41% in 2007
and 50% in 2009. The raw data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project, the basis for
our econometric analysis in the next section, shows a similar pattern (see Madrid, 2012, p. 254,
for discussion). Thus the Bolivian case further highlights not only the popularity of the removal
of checks on presidential power but also that this strengthened peoples belief in democracy. In
our model, this is because removing checks and balances helps people to get a policy closer to
the one they want.
Summing up the commonalities of the political transitions which have occurred in Ecuador,
Venezuela and Bolivia, Ellner (2012, p.98-99) argues that a distinguishing feature is their
defense of radical democracy ... and rejection of many of the precepts of liberal democracy
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... [which] with its central concern for the rights and prerogatives of minorities (which is often
synonymous with elites), places a premium of the system of checks and balances and the
di¤usion of authority. Our model formalizes precisely why citizens in these countries would
wish to move from liberalto radicaldemocracy.
3.2 Econometric Evidence
Data Description and Empirical Strategy
We use the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) conducted by Vanderbilt University.
LAPOP is a biannual survey covering over 25 countries from the Americas since 2006. Our
sample comprises 18 Latin American countries for which we have complete data.22
The main question we focus on is: Do you think that sometimes there can be su¢ cient
grounds for the president to shut down the congress or do you think there can never be su¢ cient
grounds to do so?. The possible answers are yes, no or do not know. We coded those who
answered yes with 1, answers of no with 0 and treat do not knows as missing values. This
implies that this variable captures the share of people who believe the president may have
enough grounds to close the congress.
We use two other questions related to peoples beliefs and perceptions. The rst is a question
we refer to as eliteworded as: The biggest obstacle to progress in our country is the dominant
class or oligarchy that takes advantage of the people. How much do you agree or disagree with
that view?. The second is a question we refer to as inequality: The government should
implement rm policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what
extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?.Both variables are reported on a 1 to 7
scale and to simplify the interpretation of the results we normalize them between 0 and 1, with
1 corresponding to the strongest agreement with the statement. The 2008 survey is the only
one that includes all three questions (as well as income).23
We also use information on individuals household income and on the following demographics:
gender, marital status, age, number of children, education, race, size of municipality, and rural
municipality. Monthly household income is reported in one of ten brackets constructed for each
country based on its currency and income distribution in each country. We group these income
brackets in ve groups into ve quintiles, encompassing approximately a fth of the sample
(approximate not exact because the income variable is bracketed). Quintile 1 corresponds to
22These are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The remaining countries in
the survey are three Caribbean countries with the required data (the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica)
and four other countries, Canada, Guyana, Trinidad and the United States, with one or more of the closing the
congress, elite and inequality variables missing.
We exclude the Caribbean countries, since the political dynamics emphasized in this paper seem less relevant
for them, with the exception of the Dominican Republic. In any case, our results are essentially the same when
these three countries are included (in which case the Dominican Republic can be included in the reform group of
countries, which also makes little di¤erence to the results).
23The question on closing the congress is also included in the 2010 survey, which, however, does not contain
the elite question.
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the poorest 1/5.24
The key to our empirical strategy is to investigate whether the support for the closing of
congress is greater among the poor and those wishing to further reduce inequality when they
believe the elite dominates and controls politics  in terms of our model, the variable q (in
particular, Proposition 3 and Corollaries 1 and 2). We use three strategies to proxy for q.
First, we classify countries where there have been referenda to remove checks on presidential
powers, especially vis-à-vis the legislature, and/or countries where there have been any reforms
increasing presidential powers as high q (and the rest as low q). We view this as the most theory-
driven way of dividing countries in our sample into high q and low q; according to our model, in
countries with q greater than a certain threshold, there will be popular support for dismantling
checks and balances and in consequence, a referendum for such dismantling, while in countries
with q lower than this threshold, there will not be such referenda. The group of countries where
there have been removal of congressional checks on presidential powers since the late 1980s,
which we designate as the removalcountries, includes Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru and
Venezuela. The group of countries where there have been any such reforms, designated as the
reform countries, comprises Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Peru and Venezuela.25
Our second strategy, instead, uses recent data on various institutional and economic char-
acteristics. The rst is an index of political rights from the Freedom House data, providing a
continuous measure of the quality of democracy. Higher quality democracies naturally corre-
spond to those with low q. We also look at the control of corruption index from the World
Bank, which captures general bureaucratic and political corruption in the economy. It is nat-
ural to expect countries where corruption is endemic to have a greater likelihood of the capture
of politicians by powerful interest groups, and thus high q. Our third measure is an index of
political stability from the World Bank, which represents the likelihood that the government
will be destabilized or overthrown via unconstitutional means and thus also captures another
dimension of the strength of democracy. Our nal measure is oil production to GDP ratio (again
from the World Bank) based on the idea that the possibility that countries with more resources
that are easily taxed should increase the likelihood of support for increasing presidential powers
(e.g., Corollary 3). In each case, we take the average of these indices between 1996 and 2006 to
capture the quality of institutions in the years preceding the survey.26
Our third strategy is to directly use individual perceptions captured by the elite variable.
In particular, it is natural to expect that individuals who respond that the elite is the biggest
24We have experimented with di¤erent ways of constructing income brackets, with very similar results. In
particular, creating the quintiles on the basis of the income distribution for the entire Latin American sample
(rather than separately for each country) gives almost identical results.
25 Information on the removal of checks and balances in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela is provided in the
previous subsection and on Nicaragua and Peru in footnote 17. In addition, in Argentina, President Carlos
Menem ran for o¢ ce again in 1994 by changing the constitution to relax term limits. In Columbia, President
Álvaro Uribe did the same in 2004. In Honduras, President Manuel Zelaya attempted to start a process of
constitutional change in 2009, which was stopped by a coup.
26Changing this window has little e¤ect on the results we report below.
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obstacle to progress believe that q is high and thus, according to our mechanism, should support
the closing of congress (particularly when they also think inequality should be reduced and when
they are in the low income groups).
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample and also separately for the subsamples
that have experienced referenda for increasing presidential powers against the legislature and the
rest. It also shows the main descriptive statistics for individuals sorted into two groups, those in
the bottom four income quintiles and those at the top (richest) income quintile.27 The number
of observations at the bottom of the table shows that the high income group, corresponding to
top income quintile, makes up about 1/5 of the sample for each country.
TABLE 1 HERE
A non-trivial fraction of the population in our sample (25%) think that it is justiable to close
the congress. Notably, this is higher in countries in the removalcategory (Bolivia, Ecuador,
Nicaragua and Venezuela) that have undergone a referendum on this issue than in the rest.
More interestingly, those in the top income quintile are less likely to think so in the removal
countries (34% in the top quintile vs. 36% in the bottom four quintiles), while in the remaining
countries they are actually more likely to think so.
A signicant fraction of the population in all countries and all income groups agrees with
the statement that the elite is the biggest obstacle to progress across countries and supports
redistribution to reduce inequality. Perhaps surprisingly, these are higher in the rest of the
countries than in the removalcountries. Finally, years of education are clearly higher among
those in the top quintile, and there is a slight educational advantage to individuals in the
removalcountries.
Results
Table 2 reports our main results. We pool the data across all countries in our sample, and run
a regression of the dummy for the support of the president to close the congress on a country
dummy, the survey responses to the elite and inequality questions, four quintiles of income
(the richest, quintile 5 being the omitted group), and the following controls: marital status, a
quartic in age, educational achievement dummies, race dummies, number of children, sex, size
of municipality and a dummy for urban area.28 In addition, we include interactions between
the elite and inequality, elite and poor (a dummy for individual being in the income quintiles
1-4), and poor and inequality variables, and interactions between various institutional variables
(entered in di¤erent columns) and the poor, inequality and elite variables. Throughout, the
main e¤ects are evaluated at the sample mean values for the elite and inequality variables and
at the highest values of the institutional variables (so that they correspond to the main e¤ects
27The survey suggests that Bolivian, Ecuadorian and Chilean data should be weighted with the sample weights,
and the rest should not be (in fact, provides no sample weights). We follow this in all the results we report.
28Our results are essentially identical with probit regressions.
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for a country with the best institutions). The standard errors are robust and allow for clustering
at the municipality level.29
We expect the interactions between the elite and inequality and the elite and poor variables
to be positive  to capture the notion that those wishing to see greater redistribution and those
with low income, when they believe q is high, should be in support of closing the congress. We
also expect interactions of the variables for inequality and poor with our various institutional
variables (the dummies for removal and reform as well as political rights, control of corruption,
political instability and oil to GDP ratio) to be signicant. With the same reasoning, we may
further expect the interactions between these institutions and the elite variables to be signicant
as well, since those seeing the elite as a major obstacle to progress need not support closing of the
congress unless they also believe that political corruption is widespread; it is the combination of
lack of trust in institutions and suspicion of the elite that should fuel the mechanisms proposed
in this paper (and our results in fact support this interpretation as we will see below).
TABLE 2 HERE
Column 1 shows the basic correlations without any of the interaction variables. We see that
those who believe the elite is a major obstacle to progress are more likely to support the closing
of the congress. The e¤ects are quantitatively signicant but small. Moving from 0 to 1 in the
question (from the lowest to highest) increases the likelihood that individual supports the closing
of the congress by about 3.4 percentage points. Those wishing to see greater redistribution and
those in the lower four income quintiles are also more likely to support such an action, but these
e¤ects are not statistically signicant.
Column 2 includes interactions between elite and inequality, elite and poor and inequality
and poor. The last two are never signicant, but the interaction between elite and inequality
variables is now (marginally) statistically signicant, and quantitatively large: an individual who
strongly agrees with the statement that inequality should be reduced further is 6.8 percentage
points more likely to support the closing of the congress.
Column 3 adds the interactions with the removal dummy. Three things are noteworthy
here. First, once this is done, the main e¤ects of the elite and inequality variables, which were
statistically signicant in column 2, are no longer signicant, suggesting that in countries that
do not undergo referenda for removing checks on presidents, those viewing the elite as the main
obstacle to progress and those wishing to see greater redistribution are not more likely to support
the closing of the congress  as hinted at above, the main e¤ects were instead driven by the
attitudes of such individuals in countries that did undergo referenda. Second, the interaction
between inequality and elite variables increases in magnitude to 7.9 percentage points (and is
now signicant at 5%). Third, the interactions of the removal dummy with the poor, elite and
29Costa Rica is the only country for which the number of clusters may be low. It only has 29 clusters, while
the rest of countries have 51 or more. However, clustering at a lower disaggregation level for Costa Rica, or not
clustering at all does not change the results.
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inequality variables are all statistically signicant (at 5%). In each case, the quantitative e¤ects
are sizable. For example, those who believe that the government should reduce inequality are
11.9 percentage points more likely to support the closing of the congress in the removal countries
than the rest, while those in the bottom four quintiles of income are 6.3 percentage points more
likely to do so than those in the top quintile. This pattern, which largely anticipates that in the
subsequent columns, suggests that the support for the closing of the congress is generally higher
among those who simultaneously are in a society where elite capture of political institutions is
a signicant concern and who are also in favor of greater redistribution, generally poorer, and
view the elite as a major obstacle to progress in society.
Column 4 shows a similar pattern, but now with the reform dummy as a proxy for q. The
results are very similar to those in column 3, with the only di¤erence that the interaction between
the reform dummy and the inequality variable is no longer statistically signicant.
Column 5 shows the same results using the political rights variables that proxy for q. The
overall pattern is again similar, but now only the interaction between this institutional variable
and the inequality variable is statistically signicant (and the interaction between the elite and
inequality variables continues to be signicant). Recalling that now low values of the institutional
variable corresponds to high q, we see that the quantitative magnitude of the relevant e¤ect is
still sizable: an individual who strongly agrees that inequality should be reduced further is 19.8
percentage points more likely to support the closing of the congress in a society with the worst
political rights index (as compared to the best).
Column 6 repeats the same exercise with the control of corruption index. The overall pattern
is again similar, but now only the interaction with the poor (the individual being in one of the
lowest for quintiles of income) is signicant (again at 5%). Column 7 uses the political stability
variable, and now the interaction of this institutional variable and the elite and inequality
questions are statistically signicant, in each case at 5%.
Finally, column 8 is for the oil to GDP ratio, and shows that interactions with the poor
and inequality variables are now statistically signicant. This suggests that those in the lower
income quintiles and those wishing to see greater redistribution to reduce inequality are more
likely to support a closing of the congress in an economy with signicant oil production than
one without.
Overall, we interpret this evidence as broadly supportive of the main ideas emphasized in
this paper. It is particularly encouraging that it is individuals who wish to increase government
redistribution to reduce inequality and those who are poorer that support the closing of the
congress and especially when they also think that the elite is a major obstacle to progress
and/or when they are in a society in which institutions are weak, as witnessed by attempts to
increase presidential powers (our theory-driven measure of q) or as measured by the standard
institutional indices.
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4 Conclusion
In many weakly-institutionalized democracies, particularly in Latin America, voters have re-
cently dismantled constitutional checks and balances that are commonly thought to limit presi-
dential rents and abuses of power. In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model of checks and
balances in which voters may vote for the removal of such constraints on presidential power. Our
main argument is simple: checks and balances are indeed e¤ective (at least partially) in reducing
presidential discretion and prevent policies that are not in line with the interests of the major-
ity of the citizens. This naturally reduces presidential rents, which is however a double-edged
sword. By reducing presidential rents, checks and balances make it cheaper to bribe or inuence
politicians through non-electoral means such as lobbying and bribes. In weakly-institutionalized
polities where such non-electoral inuences, particularly by the better organized elite, are a
major concern, voters may prefer a political system without checks and balances as a way of
insulating politicians from these inuences. In consequence, voters may dismantle checks and
balances, implicitly accepting a certain amount of politician rent or politicianspet policies that
they do not like, in order to ensure redistribution when they believe that the rich elite can
inuence politics through non-electoral means.
Though simple, our model leads to a number of interesting comparative statics. In particular,
we show that checks and balances are less likely to emerge when politician rents are low in
equilibrium; when the elite is better organized and are more likely to be able to inuence or
bribe politicians; and when inequality and potential taxes are high (which makes redistribution
more valuable to the majority).
To illustrate the main insight in this paper, that checks and balances by reducing politician
rents also make them easier to bribe by the better organized rich elite, we set up a very simple
model of checks and balances in which the legislature can control the distribution of rents between
itself and the president, forcing the president to choose zero rents and use all tax revenues for
redistribution. We show in the online appendix that the same insights apply with di¤erent
models of checks and balances. In particular, we analyze both a model in which the presence
of checks and balances implies veto power by the president and the legislature related to the
view in Diermeier and Myerson (1999) and a variant of the model proposed by Persson, Roland
and Tabellini (1997, 2000), where separation of powers (checks and balances) corresponds to
the separation of taxation and spending decisions. With both alternatives, it continues to be
the case that checks and balances, again by making politicians cheaper to bribe, are potentially
costly to the majority, is valid under di¤erent ways of modeling the form of checks and balances.
We also show how providing representation to political minorities (here the rich elite) in the
legislature, paradoxically, may make the rich worse o¤ because it encourages dismantlement of
checks and balances.
We have also provided case study and empirical evidence that in weak Latin American
democracies  measured according to standard indices, or measured according to individuals
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perceptions, or where presidents have sought to reduce checks and balances  there is support
from those wishing to increase redistribution and from poorer citizens to reduce checks on
presidential power.
We view our paper as only one facet of the paradoxes of democratic politics under weak
institutions. The more general message is that in such environments, political conict can lead
to the opposite of the results that we are used to from environments with strong institutions.
Thus while voters always prefer checks and balances under strong institutions, they may prefer
the absence of checks and balances under weak institutions. Similarly, perhaps, under weak
institutions, voters may vote for incumbents that have chosen policies that are not in line with
their preferences because this may be viewed as a signal that politicians are independent (as
argued in Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin, 2011). Furthermore, under weak institutions political
competition can lead to a situation in which the group currently holding power may fear a
power switch and as a result, entirely fail to monitor its leaders (e.g., Padro-i-Miquel, 2007) and
a leveling of the democratic playing eld may sometimes lead to worse outcomes because of the
reactions from the elite that this engenders (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). We believe
that further analysis of how, under weak institutions, political competition works and may get
distorted, and perhaps how it can be designed so that it does not, is a fruitful area of future
research.
Appendix A
In this appendix we show that without checks and balances there does not exist a bribing
proposal that gives the rich strictly higher utility, and also that all bribing proposals are payo¤
equivalent for all agents. The problem for the rich lobby to solve is
max
fb^P ;T^ p;T^ r;R^P ;^g
(1  ^) y

+ T^ r   b^
P

subject to
v

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
+ (1  )

(1  ^) (1  )y
1   + T^
p

 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1  

^ y  (1  )T^ p + T^ r + R^P :
Denoting the multipliers on the two constraints by 1 and 2, the rst-order conditions with
respect to b^P , T^ p, T^ r, R^P and ^ are:
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+ 1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0
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
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From (A-1) it follows that 1 > 0 and from (A-3) that 2 > 0, establishing that the participa-
tion constraint of the president and the budget constraint both hold with equality. Substituting
for 1 and 2 in (A-2) we nd
v0

b^P + R^P

=
1  
1   ; (A-6)
which implies, from (6), that b^P + R^P = R. From the participation constraint of the president
holding with equality, the income of poor agents must be unchanged compared to the case
without bribing. Substituting for T^ p from the budget constraint in the participation constraint
of the president we then nd the tax rate as
^ =    b^
P   T^ r
y
:
Substituting this in the maximand of the rich we nd
(1  ^) y

+ T^ r   b^
P

=
(1  ) y

;
which shows that any bribing proposal leaves the rich with the same income as if they do not
bribe. Thus any lower tax rate or higher transfer to the rich must be compensated by the exact
same amount in bribes, leaving all agents with the exact same utility as if there is no bribing.
(Also, note that (A-5) is redundant as inserting from 1 and 2 this reduces to (A-6)). Thus
without loss of any generality we consider the case where b^P = 0.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Removal of Rest of
Country group: Full Sample Checks and Balances Countries in Sample
Quintile: All quintiles Bottom four Top quintile Bottom four Top quintile
Justifiable to close congress 0.25 0.36 0.34 0.20 0.23
( 0.43) ( 0.48) ( 0.47) ( 0.40) ( 0.42)
Elite 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.64 0.62
( 0.33) ( 0.33) ( 0.33) ( 0.33) ( 0.34)
Inequality 0.79 0.75 0.73 0.82 0.80
( 0.27) ( 0.29) ( 0.30) ( 0.26) ( 0.27)
Age 38.74 37.24 36.97 39.60 37.91
( 15.77) ( 15.25) ( 15.00) ( 16.16) ( 14.65)
Years of education 8.98 9.26 13.00 7.95 12.34
( 4.53) ( 4.36) ( 3.77) ( 4.24) ( 3.98)
Observations 25929 7760 1502 14059 2608
Notes: Sample averages with standard deviation in parentheses. Data from LAPOP surveys for 18 Latin American countries
for the year 2008 (Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela). The removal countries are Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua,
Peru and Venezuela, where explicit congressional checks on presidential powers were removed since the late 1980s. “Justifiable to
close congress” is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the respondent agrees that there could be sufficient grounds to
close the congress. “Elite” and “Inequality” variables take values between 0 and 1, and measure perceptions of how bad the elite
is for development and how much the government should take actions to reduce inequality, respectively (see text for details). All
statistics are weighted using the sample weights provided by LAPOP.
Table 2: Determinants of Support for Closing Congress.
Interacted Variable:
Removal Reform Political Control of Political Oil to
Dummy Dummy Rights (FH) Corruption Stability GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Poor 0.010 0.010 -0.009 -0.017 0.003 -0.033 0.002 -0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.011)
Elite 0.034∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.016 0.009 0.013 -0.000 -0.013 0.026∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.029) (0.019) (0.013)
Inequality 0.016 0.024∗ -0.013 0.009 -0.021 -0.020 -0.035 0.013
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.040) (0.025) (0.016)
Poor× Elite -0.016 -0.014 -0.010 -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.011
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Elite× Inequality 0.068∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.072∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035)
Inequality× Poor 0.030 0.046 0.045 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.054
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
Interaction with Poor 0.063∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.068∗∗ -0.019 0.006∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.066) (0.034) (0.038) (0.002)
Interaction with Elite 0.050∗∗ 0.051∗∗ -0.083 -0.050 -0.112∗∗ 0.003
(0.025) (0.022) (0.076) (0.045) (0.044) (0.003)
Interaction with Inequality 0.119∗∗∗ 0.032 -0.198∗∗ -0.067 -0.144∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.030) (0.028) (0.090) (0.061) (0.055) (0.002)
Observations 20740 20740 20740 20740 20740 20740 20740 20142
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Notes: Dependent variable: “Justifiable to close congress” from LAPOP 2008. See notes to Table 1 and text for details on this
and the other variables. Columns 3 to 8 report the interactions between the variable mentioned at top of the column with the
poor, elite and inequality variables. The “Removal Dummy” takes the value of 1 for Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru and
Venezuela, where explicit congressional checks on presidential powers were removed since the late 1980s. The “Reform Dummy”
takes the value of 1 for any country that passed laws increasing presidential powers since the late 1980s, comprising of Argentina,
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela. In all columns, the main effects are evaluated at the
means of the elite, inequality and poor variables. In addition, in columns 3 and 4, the main effects are evaluated for countries
where the dummies are zero. Political Rights is averaged between 1996-2006 and normalized between zero (less rights) and
one (more rights). The main effects are evaluated at countries with the maximum score of one. Control of Corruption and
Political Stability are both averaged between 1996-2006 and normalized between zero and one. The main effects are evaluated
for countries in the region with the maximum score of one. The last column presents interactions with oil production relative to
GDP (average between 1996 and 2006) with the main effects evaluated at countries with no oil. Other covariates included but
not reported in the table are: the size of the city where the person lives and if it is rural or urban, marital status, race, a quartic
in age, number of children and educational achievement dummies. Robust standard errors with clustering by municipality are
shown in parentheses. The reported coefficients with ∗∗∗ are significant at the 1% level; those with ∗∗ are significant at the 5%
level; and those with ∗ are significant at the 10% level.
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1 Introduction
The main insight in the paper is that checks and balances may be costly for the poor majority
because, by reducing the president’s rents, they make him more amenable to lobbying and
bribery by an organized rich lobby. In this online appendix, we show that this main insight
is robust under a variety of diﬀerent modeling assumptions. We first consider another model
of separation of powers, along the lines of Diermeier and Myerson (1999) and Tsebelis (2002),
where checks and balances give the legislature veto power over all dimensions of policy. We next
show that if instead of our simple model of separation of powers, we adopt the Persson, Roland
and Tabellini (1997, 2000) approach of assuming that, under separation of powers, the president
decides the tax rate and the legislature makes the spending decisions, all of our results generalize.
We next use this framework to discuss how including political minorities (representatives of the
rich elite) in the legislature aﬀects the results. Finally, we also show that the same results apply
when we relax the quasi-linearity of the utility of politicians.
2 Extensions to the Basic Model
In this section, we extend the basic model in the paper. Some of the more technical parts are
collected in the appendix.
2.1 Checks and Balances as Veto Powers
In Section 2 in the paper, we modeled checks and balances as corresponding to a separation of
policy decisions between the president and the legislature. A complimentary view of checks and
balances relates it to the existence and power of “veto players”, for example as in Diermeier and
Myerson (1999) and Tsebelis (2002). We now show that the general insights presented so far
continue to hold with this alternative but complementary view of checks and balances.
More specifically, we start, again, with the legislature consisting of a single chamber and
a single legislator, who again represents the poor (all of these features will be relaxed below).
We then adopt the following stylized game as a representation of the process of bargaining and
political interactions between the president and the legislature in the presence of checks and
balances:
1. The president proposes a tax rate  . If the legislator agrees, the tax rate is implemented.
If the legislator vetoes the tax rate, then the legislator proposes a new tax rate. If the
president agrees, the tax rate is implemented. If the president vetoes the tax rate, the
status quo tax rate e ≤ ¯ is implemented.
2. The president proposes transfers to the poor   (limited by the total budget  ¯). If the
legislator agrees, then the transfer is implemented. If the legislator vetoes the transfer,
the legislator proposes a new transfer. If the president agrees the transfer is implemented.
If the president vetoes the transfer, the status quo transfer f  is implemented.
B-1
3. The president proposes transfers to the rich   (limited by the total budget  ¯−(1−) ).
If the legislator agrees, then the transfer is implemented. If the legislator vetoes the trans-
fer, the legislator proposes a new transfer. If the president agrees the transfer is imple-
mented. If the president vetoes the transfer, the status quo transfer f  is implemented.
4. The president proposes rents  to himself (limited by the available budget  ¯ − (1 −
)  −  ). If the legislator agrees the rents are implemented. If the legislator vetoes
the rents, the legislator proposes a new rent allocation to the president. If the president
agrees, the rents are implemented. If the president vetoes the rents, then the status quo
rents f is implemented.
5. The president proposes rents  to the legislator (limited by the available budget  ¯ −
(1− ) −  − ). If the legislator agrees, the rents are implemented. If the legislator
vetoes, the legislator proposes a new rent allocation. If the president agrees the rents are
implemented. If the president vetoes, the status quo rents f is implemented.
6. Any remaining funds on the budget;  ¯ − (1 − )  −   −  −  are distributed
lump-sum to citizens.
There are two special features of this game that are worth noting. First, rather than the
entire vector of policies and rents being agreed at once, they are being negotiated component
by component. Second, the last player to make proposals before the status quo is implemented
is always the legislator. Both of these features are adopted to simplify the analysis. Moreover,
it will be clear from our analysis that the exact sequencing of policy decisions has no bearing on
the results. Finally, let us also simplify the algebra by setting f = f = 0. Clearly, greater
values of f and f make checks and balances less attractive to voters. Thus the simplifying
assumption makes checks and balances more attractive to voters (and so our results that they
may elect to remove checks and balances more striking).
As usual we proceed with backwards induction. Consider first the case where  = 0 so that
the rich are not able to solve their collective action problem and will not make a bribe oﬀer. The
president will veto any rents to the legislator, since transferring funds to citizens will provide
him with higher utility. Realizing this, the legislator will accept zero rents. Then in equilibrium
the president will indeed propose zero rents. In the same way the legislator will veto rents to the
president, and realizing this the president proposes zero rents which the legislator accepts. Since
there will be no rents in this case, the president proposes to use the whole budget as transfers
to the poor, and the legislator will accept this. Realizing that all funds will be used as transfers
to the poor, a president from the poor group will then propose the maximum tax rate ¯ , and
the legislator will accept this. Thus when  = 0 the solution is exactly the same as in the basic
model in the paper.
Consider next the case where  = 1 so that the rich can influence policy through bribing.
The rich will now need to bribe both the president and the legislator. Thus, for exactly the
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same reason as in the model with a judiciary that can be bribed, ∗ from the basic model needs
to be replaced by ∗∗, and ∗ by ∗∗, and we have the following proposition.
Proposition B-1 All of the results in Proposition 3 in the paper and the subsequent corollaries
hold in the current model (with ∗∗ replacing ∗ and ∗∗ replacing ∗).
Multicameral Legislature
In line with Diermeier and Myerson (1999), we now allow the legislature to consist of multiple
chambers, each consisting of a single legislator. Each chamber has veto and proposal powers.
To highlight the implications of multiple chambers, we continue to assume that all legislators
are from the poor group (this will be relaxed in subsection 2.3). In this case the voters elect
a president and  ≥ 1 chambers of the legislature. Each chamber consists of one legislator.
Thus when  = 1 we have a unicameral legislature as above, when  = 2 we have a bicameral
legislature, and so on. Note that  in our setting closely maps to the “hurdle factor” in Diermeier
and Myerson (1999), which captures, the number of veto players that have to be bribed if policy
is to be changed compared to a situation without bribing. As in Diermeier and Myerson (1999)
the multicameral legislature is serial. Thus the timing is exactly as above, except that now a
policy proposal has to pass through multiple chambers and can be vetoed by each of them in
turn.
Consider first the case where  = 0 so that the rich are not able to solve their collective
action problem. By exactly the same logic as above it is easy to see that policy is still the same
as in the basic model in Section 2 of the paper.
Consider next the case where  = 1 so that the rich can influence policy through bribing.
Compared to the situation with a unicameral legislature the rich now have to bribe the presi-
dent and  chambers. The maximization problem is analogous to the case with a unicameral
legislature, except that now there are 1+ politicians’ participation constraints that have to be
satisfied. Going through the same maximization as above we find that the president and all of
the legislators receive the same bribe, and that ˆ  = 0 and ˆ = ¯ if

1− 
0
³
ˆ
´
 1 + 
1−  
where ˆ is the solution to the maximization problem in (11) in the text (see the proof of
Proposition 2). This in turn implies that, similar to ∗ in the text, the critical value of  for
ˆ  = 0 and ˆ = ¯ is given by
∗∗∗
1− ∗∗∗ 
0
³
ˆ (∗∗∗)
´
=
1 + 
1−  
This equation implies that ∗∗∗ is increasing in the hurdle factor . Intuitively, when there are
more chambers with veto power, there will be more legislators to bribe, and this makes it more
likely that the bribing proposal will include some income redistribution (since this enables lower
bribes for each legislator). Also, note that except for this modification, the analysis in Section 2
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of the paper still carries over to the present case with ∗ replaced by ∗∗∗ and ∗∗∗  ∗replaced
by ∗∗∗, where ∗∗∗ is given by 0(∗∗) = (1 + )(1 − ) (1− ). Thus we have the following
proposition:
Proposition B-2 Consider the case with a serial multicameral legislature with veto powers.
Then all of the results in Proposition 3 and the subsequent corollaries still hold (with ∗∗∗
replacing ∗and ∗∗∗ replacing ∗).
Thus the model with checks and balances as veto powers leads to similar insights as our basic
model presented in Section 2 of the paper. However, the multicameral extension discussed here
also implies that a greater  may make checks and balances more likely to emerge in equilibrium.
This result, however, depends on the assumption that all chambers contain legislators from the
poor income group. In subsection 2.3, we will see that legislative structures that also empower
political minorities (here the rich minority) may paradoxically make checks and balances less
likely in equilibrium because they may reduce the rents of the president even further and make
him even cheaper to buy/influence.
2.2 Separation of Taxation and Spending Decisions
In this subsection, we show that our main insights are also robust to another popular way of
modeling checks and balances. In particular, we follow Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997,
2000) and assume that the presence of checks and balances corresponds to the separation of
taxation and spending decisions. More specifically, the president sets the tax rate and the
legislator makes all the spending decisions. Recall that the budget constraint is
(1− )  +   + + ≤  ¯ (B-1)
Recall also that without checks and balances the rents to the president are determined as
 = ∗, where ∗ satisfies
0 (∗) = 1− 
1−   (B-2)
The transfer to the poor is given by   = (¯ ¯ −∗)  (1− ). The utility of poor agents is given
by
 [ = 0  = 0] = (¯  + 1− ) ¯ −
∗
1−   (B-3)
Next, suppose that  = 1. In this case, the rich lobby can make a bribe oﬀer,n
ˆ  ˆ  ˆ  ˆ  ˆ ˆ
o
. However, for the same reason as in Section 2 in the paper we can
also see that in this case the rich lobby can never get strictly higher utility by oﬀering a bribe.
There would be no oﬀer that the rich lobby can make that would be acceptable to the politician
and at the same time increase their own utility.
The following proposition summarizes the case without checks and balances:
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Proposition B-3 Suppose the constitution involves no checks and balances (i.e.,  = 0). Then
the equilibrium policy involves  = ¯ ,  = ∗ (as given by (B-2)),  = 0,  = 0,  = 0,
  = 0, and   = (¯ ¯ −∗)  (1− ). The utility of poor agents in this case is given by (B-3).
Next, suppose that there is separation of powers ( = 1) and again start with  = 0, so that
the rich are not able to solve their collective action problem and will not make a bribe oﬀer. In
the policy-making subgame, the legislator will make the spending decisions and will solve the
program
  [   = 1  = 0] ≡ max
{  }
 ¡¢+ (1− ) ((1− ) +  ) 
subject to the government budget constraint (B-1) and the tax rate  decided by the president.
The solution in this case is   =  = 0, and
 = min {∗  ¯}  (B-4)
and
  =  ¯ −

1−   (B-5)
Given this the president sets the tax rate so as to maximize
 [ = 1  = 0] ≡ max 
¡ ¢+ (1− ) ((1− ) +  ) 
subject to the best response spending policy of the legislator, i.e., subject to
{      } ∈ argmax [   = 1  = 0]
Since separation of powers gives  = 0, we have that
 = argmax 0
£ (0) + (1− ) ¡(1−  0) +  ¢¤ = argmax 0 
Therefore, in this case the president will set the tax rate so as to maximize utility of the poor.
The president realizes that tax income in excess of ∗ will be transferred to the poor while
none of the tax income will end up as rents for the president. Thus compared to the case without
checks and balances it is now less tempting for the president to tax. The income of the poor if
the tax rate is set to zero is (1− )¯ (1− ), while the income of the poor if the tax rate is set
so as to maximize the income transfers to the poor is given by (B-3). The president sets the tax
rate to zero or ¯ depending on what maximizes the income of the poor. If ∗ is greater than
¯ ¯, then the tax rate is set to zero, while if ∗ is less than ¯ ¯ the tax rate is set to ¯ .
Note from (B-2) that ∗ = ∗() and let  be defined by
∗() = ¯ ¯
which inserting for ∗() in (B-2) yields
 = 1
1 + (1− )0(¯ ¯)  (B-6)
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Then when    the weight the legislator puts on his own utility is suﬃciently small that
the president still adopts the maximum tax rate  = ¯ , while when    the income of
the poor is maximized by setting  = 0. In this latter case when  = 0 it follows from the
government budget constraint (B-1) that under checks and balances then when  = 0 policy is
  =   =  =  = 0.
The situation when there are checks and balances and the rich lobby is organized (i.e.,
 = 1 and  = 1) is a little more involved. In this case, the rich lobby will make bribe oﬀersn
ˆ ˆ  ˆ  ˆ ˆ
o
and
n
ˆ  ˆ
o
to the legislator and the president, respectively. For the
politicians to accept these bribe oﬀers they must satisfy the participation constraints
 
³
ˆ ˆ  ˆ  ˆ  ˆ ˆ
´
≥   [ = 1  = 0] 
and
 
³
ˆ  ˆ  ˆ  ˆ  ˆ ˆ
´
≥   [ = 1  = 0] 
Consider first the case where    . Here the tax rate without bribing is set at its maximum
 = ¯ , and the legislator obtains his bliss point policy with positive rents and transfers to the
poor. Thus the rich lobby has nothing to oﬀer him that they find it worth paying for. However,
in this case the president can be bribed. Since checks and balances means no rents for the
president, he becomes cheap to buy for the rich lobby. The rich lobby can oﬀer him rents in
exchange for a lower tax rate, taking into account that the legislator will set policy according to
(B-5) and (B-4). Since when  = 0 the marginal utility of bribes is higher than the president’s
marginal utility of transfers the poor, it will be beneficial for the rich lobby to bribe and induce
the president to set a tax rate lower than  = ¯ . But for this reason of course, it is already
clear that a constitution with checks and balances can never be an equilibrium when    ;
in this case the poor prefer  = ¯ which they will always get when the constitution does not
involve checks and balances. Thus in this case, checks and balances simply make the president
too cheap to buy for the rich lobby, in turn limiting redistribution to the poor. Since they are
straightforward, we do not provide details of this case.
When    the tax rate without bribing is set to zero. This leaves both the president and
the legislator with zero rents, making both of them cheap to buy for the rich lobby. The rich
lobby can then bribe politicians into redistributing income to themselves. The only remaining
question is to determine the cheapest way for the rich lobby to capture the politicians. As
should now be clear from the paper, since we have direct income transfers there are many
bribing proposals that will be payoﬀ equivalent to all agents. Without loss of any generality
we focus here on the case where the tax rate is set at its maximum, and all redistribution to
diﬀerent gropus is undertaken by targeted transfers.
Intuitively, when there is no bribing and rents are zero, the marginal utility of rents for
politicians is relatively high. As a consequence, bribing politicians will always imply positive
direct bribes. Moreover, if politicians put suﬃciently high weight, 1 − , on the utility of the
members of their group and if income distribution is not too unequal, then the bribing proposal
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will also contain direct income transfers to the poor. In the converse case where  is high
and income distribution is relatively unequal, it is more eﬃcient for the rich lobby to capture
politicians by oﬀering direct bribes rather than income transfers to the poor. This latter result
is particularly interesting because it implies that when inequality is high, which is when we
would typically expect greater redistribution, the poor may in fact receive no redistribution.
Intuitively, this is because greater inequality also increases the willingness of the rich to use
bribes to reduce redistribution. The details of the analysis of this case, which underlies Part
1.(b) of Proposition B-4, is provided in Section 2.2 below.
The next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition B-4 Suppose  = 1. Let  be given as in (B-6).
1. Suppose that    .
(a) When  = 0 so that there is no bribing, the equilibrium involves  = 0,  = 0,
 = 0,   = 0, and   = 0.
(b) When  = 1, there exist ∗ and  such that:
i. If   ∗ or   , then  = ¯ ,  = 0,  = 0,  =   0,   = 0, and
   0.
ii. If   ∗ and   , then  = ¯ ,  = 0,  = 0,  =  = ∗, with ∗
determined by 0 (∗) = 2(1− ) (1− ),    0, and    0.
Taking into account that the probability the rich can solve their collective action prob-
lem and bribe politicians is , we have that:
If   ∗ or   , then the expected utility of poor agents is
 [ = 1] = (1− )(1− ¯)
1−  ¯ (B-7)
If   ∗ and   , then the expected utility of poor agents is
 [ = 1] = 1− 
1−  ¯ −

1− 
µ
2(∗)
0 (∗)
¶
 (B-8)
2. Suppose that    .
(a) When  = 0, the equilibrium involves  = ¯ ,  = 0,  = ∗,   = (¯ ¯−∗)(1−
), and   = 0.
(b) When  = 1, the equilibrium involves   ¯ ,  = 0,  ≤ ∗,   0,  = 0,
  = ( ¯ −)(1− ), and   = 0.
Taking into account that  ≥ 0 we have that when    then  [ = 1] ≤  [ = 0].
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When politicians put suﬃciently high weight on rents, i.e., when    , checks and bal-
ances, in the absence of bribery, lead to an equilibrium in which they obtain zero rents. This
makes them relatively cheap to bribe and influence. Given the above characterization, the
outcome in the referendum on checks and balances is straightforward to determine.
Proposition B-5 Let  be as in (B-6) and ∗ and  as in Proposition B-4.
1. Suppose that    .
(a) When   ∗ or  ≥ , the constitution will involve no checks and balances provided
that
  
∗ − ¯ ¯
(1− )¯ ¯  (B-9)
and it will involve checks and balances if the converse inequality holds.
(b) When   ∗ and   , the constitution will involve no checks and balances
provided that
  (
∗ − ¯ ¯)0 (∗)
2(∗)  (B-10)
and it will involve checks and balances if the converse inequality holds.
2. Suppose that    . Then the constitution will never involve checks and balances.
Proof. To see part 1, note that an individual from the poor income group prefers a consti-
tution without checks and balances when  [ = 0]   [ = 1]. When   ∗ or  ≥  part
1.(a) follows from (B-3) and (B-7). When   ∗ and    part 1.(b) follows from (B-3) and
(B-8). Part 2 follows since in this case poor voters prefer the president to set  = ¯ in order
to get income redistribution. In the case without checks and balances the president always sets
 = ¯ , while with checks and balances with probability  the rich lobby bribe him into setting
a lower tax rate.
This proposition shows that when checks and balances take the form of the separation of
taxation and spending, if politicians suﬃciently high weight on the utility of their group ( 
), poor voters always prefer a constitution without checks and balances. The intuition is
again similar: with concentrated power the president becomes too expensive to buy for the rich
lobby, which is good for the poor provided that the president puts a suﬃciently high weight on
their utility relative to his own rents. In contrast, when the constitution includes checks and
balances, the president is weaker, and this allows the rich lobby to bribe and obtain policies
in their favor. By inspection of (B-6), we see that the condition    is more likely to be
satisfied when income distribution is unequal ( high) and economic activity is easily taxable (¯
high). This implies that in more unequal societies and in societies where income is easier to tax,
poor voters are more likely to opt for a constitution without checks and balances, even when
politicians put more weight on their own rents.
The next two corollaries are again straightforward implications of our main result:
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Corollary 1 Suppose that    . When  = 0, so that the rich are never able to bribe
politicians, then the constitution will always include checks and balances.
Proof. This immediately follows by noting that the when  = 0 the inequalities in (B-9)
and (B-10) reduce to    , which is a contradiction.
When politicians can never be captured because the lobby are not able to solve the collective
action problem, the constitution will always involve checks and balances. This highlights again
that the reason why the majority may prefer a constitution without checks and balances is
because of the interaction between politician behavior and bribing by the rich lobby.
Similarly, a second corollary to Proposition B-5 is that:
Corollary 2 Suppose that    and   0. The comparative statics with respect to  and ¯
from the basic model continue to hold in the model with separation of taxing and spending. Thus
a constitution without checks and balances is more likely when  is greater and when ¯ is higher.
Proof. The comparative statics with respect to  follow as the left-hand sides of both (B-9)
and (B-10) are increasing in  while the right-hand sides are independent of . The comparative
statics with respect to ¯ follow as the left-hand sides of (B-9) and (B-10) are independent of ¯
while the right-hand sides are decreasing in ¯ .
But the likelihood of a constitution without checks and balances is now also aﬀected by
income inequality:
Corollary 3 Suppose that    and   0. Then a constitution without checks and balances
is more likely when  is higher, that is when income inequality is higher.
Proof. This follows as the left-hand sides of (B-9) and (B-10) are independent of  while
the right-hand sides are decreasing in .
Moreover, since in this case a greater  may tilt the equilibrium constitution from one that
features checks and balances to one that does not, we again have that the political power and
utility of the rich may in fact become lower if the rich become better at solving the collective
action problem (in the sense that  increases).
2.3 Political Minorities
In the model presented in the previous subsection, checks and balances is a way of sharing po-
litical power between the president and the legislature. However, as the poor citizens constitute
a majority and select both the legislator and the president, such checks and balances do not
transfer political power from the majority group to the minority group. In many political sys-
tems even minority groups get some political power in the legislature. We now briefly consider
an extension to allow for this possibility. The main result is the following paradoxical finding:
greater power sharing in the legislature can backfire and lead to an equilibrium with fewer checks
on the president (which is thus worse for the political minority, the rich in this case).
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To capture the eﬀect of the political power of the minority, we now assume that the legislature
consists of two (or many) elected politicians where one (group) represents the poor voters and
the other represents the rich.1 We assume that there is a probability 1 −  that a legislator
from the poor is selected to decide spending and a probability  that a legislator from the rich is
selected. The timing of events is the same as above, except that now at stage 3 where uncertainty
is revealed not only whether or not the rich can bribe becomes common knowledge, but also the
identity of the spending legislator (which was not uncertain in the model above).
It is straightforward to see that parts 1.(a) and 2 of Proposition B-5 are unaﬀected. Thus
the only situation where the extension of the model into a multi-member legislature modifies
the analysis and the results is when   ∗ and    and we are in part 1.(b) of Proposition
B-5. This is the case we focus on in this subsection, thus assuming throughout that   ∗ and
  , which implies that under checks and balances the bribing equilibrium with a legislator
and a president from the poor involves positive income transfers to the poor.
Now consider the situation with a legislator from the rich. In this case, when  = 1 (i.e.,
when it is able to oﬀer bribes), the rich lobby will prefer to include no or less income transfers to
the poor in the bribing proposal than in the case where it was facing a legislator from the poor.
Intuitively, this is because transferring resources to the poor is now less attractive for the rich
lobby as these transfers only benefit one of the politicians it is bribing. In Section 2.3 below,
we characterize the optimal bribing proposal for the rich in this case and the expected utility of
the poor from a constitution with and without checks and balances (and checks and balances
corresponding to a multi-member legislature). This characterization immediately implies:
Proposition B-6 Suppose there is a multi-member legislature,  = 1   ∗ and   .
Then there exists    such that:
1. when    , the constitution will involve no checks and balances provided that
  
∗ − ¯ ¯³
(1− )2(∗)0(∗) + (1− )¯ ¯
´  (B-11)
and it will involve checks and balances if the converse inequality holds;
2. when    , the constitution will involve no checks and balances provided that
  
∗ − ¯ ¯³
(1− )2(∗)0(∗) +  (
∗∗)
0(∗∗)
´  (B-12)
and it will involve checks and balances if the converse inequality holds.
Proof. See the Appendix.
1The implications of providing greater power/voice to political minorities can also be studied, with similar
results, using a structure similar to Diermeier and Myerson (1999) or equivalently in the context of the veto
player model introduced in subsection 2.1.
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Naturally, when  = 0, (B-11) and (B-12) both reduce to (B-10), and we obtain the same
results as in the previous subsection.
In addition, when  = 0 so that the rich are never able to bribe politicians, Proposition B-6
implies that the constitution will always include checks and balances. Moreover, it is straightfor-
ward to verify that all the comparative statics with respect to ,  and ¯ from the single-member
legislature case continue to apply in the case with a multi-member legislature.
The more interesting result from Proposition B-6 concerns the comparative statics with
respect to , which are provided in the next corollary.
Corollary 4 A greater , i.e., granting greater power to the political minority in the legislature,
makes checks and balances less likely.
Proof. This follows as the left-hand sides of (B-11) and (B-12) are independent of , while
the denominators on the right-hand sides of (B-11) and (B-12) are increasing in  (because as can
be verified in the Appendix in (B-11), (1− )¯ ¯0 (∗)  2(∗), and in (B-12),  (∗) 0 (∗) 
2(∗)0 (∗)).
This corollary thus implies that eﬀorts to protect the rights of the rich elite by giving them
greater representation in the legislature, a strategy often adopted by many newly independent
countries, may actually backfire and lead to lower checks and balances in equilibrium. This
is because increasing the representation of the rich under checks and balances makes political
corruption even more costly for the poor and discourages them from choosing checks and balances
in the first place. When this is the case granting more political power to the minority makes
them less powerful and results in policies providing them with lower utility.
2.4 Relaxing Quasi-Linearity
We now explore the solution of the model in Section 2 in the paper when the utility function of
politicians is no longer quasi-linear. In particular, suppose that the utility function of a politician
 from income group  ∈ { } is given by
  = ¡ +  + ¢ ¡ ¢1−  (B-13)
where  ∈ (0 1), and   0 denotes the ego rents of becoming an elected politician. These ego
rents may also be interpreted as the wage of a politician. With   0 the utility function is
defined and well behaved also in cases where  +  = 0.
To facilitate comparison with the model in Section 2 in the paper that does not include ego
rents, in the text we simplify by focusing on the case where  → 0, so that for simplicity the ego
rent term vanishes. Nevertheless, the presence of this vanishing term implies that even when
 =  = 0 the utility function has standard properties. We show the solution in the slightly
more complicated case when  can take any value in Section 2.4.
We first investigate the case where the constitution does not involve checks and balances,
i.e.  = 0.
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Consider first the case in which  = 0 so that the rich are not able to solve their collective
action problem and will not make a bribe oﬀer. Then, in the policy-making subgame, the
president will solve the program
  [ = 0  = 0] ≡ max
{  }
¡ + ¢ ((1− ) +  )1−  (B-14)
subject to the government budget constraint. This problem has a unique solution where incomes
are taxed at the maximum rate, with all the proceeds spent on rents to the president and transfers
to the poor (so that government budget constraint holds as equality).
Next, suppose that  = 1. Again the rich lobby can never strictly increase its utility by
oﬀering a bribe that the president will accept. Any such oﬀer is payoﬀ equivalent for all parties
and without loss of any generality we set ˆ = 0. The following proposition summarizes the
case where the constitution does not have checks and balances:
Proposition B-7 Suppose  = 0. Let → 0 and
 = ¯
1−  + ¯   (B-15)
Then the equilibrium policy always has  = ¯ . Moreover:
1. if    , then   = 0. The utility of poor agents in this case is  [ = 0] = (1− )(1−
¯)¯(1− );
2. if    , then transfers are given by
  = (¯ − (1−  + ¯ )) ¯
1−  
The utility of poor agents in this case is
 [ = 0] = 1− 
1−  (1−  + ¯ ) ¯ (B-16)
Proof. This proposition follows by letting  → 0 in the general case where  can take any
value shown in Proposition B-11 in Section 2.4.
Consider next the case where the constitution involves checks and balances, i.e.  = 1. When
 = 0 then for the same reason as in Section 2 in the paper the legislator will ensure there are
no rents to the president, which in turn has the implication that the president decides policy so
as to maximize the utility of the poor, i.e. the maximum tax rate is imposed,   = ¯ ¯(1− ),
and the utility of the poor is given by
 [ = 1  = 0] = (1−  + ¯ )¯
1−  
On the other hand when  = 1 the rich lobby can successfully bribe the president. In
particular as  → 0, the rich lobby induce the president to set the tax rate to zero, which in
turn implies that the poor will get no redistribution. In this case we have:
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Proposition B-8 Suppose  = 1 and let  → 0.
1. When  = 0 so that the rich lobby is not organized and there is no bribing, the equilibrium
involves  = ¯ ,  = 0,  = 0, and   = ¯ ¯(1− ).
2. When  = 1 so that the rich lobby is organized and there is bribing, then  = ¯ ,  = 0,
 = 0,   0,  = 0, and   = 0.
The expected utility of poor agents is given by
 [ = 1] = (1−  + ¯ ) ¯
1−  − 
¯ ¯
1−   (B-17)
Proof. This result follows by letting  → 0 in the general case where  can take any value
shown in Proposition B-12 in the Appendix.
When poor voters vote to decide if the constitution should involve checks and balances or
not we then have the proposition stated in the main paper:
Proposition B-9 Let → 0.
1. When    the constitution will always involve checks and balances.
2. When    then the constitution will involve no checks and balances if
   (1−  + ¯ )¯  (B-18)
and it will involve checks and balances if the converse inequality holds.
A greater  (a higher likelihood of the rich lobby being organized) makes a constitution
without checks and balances more likely.
Proof. Part 1 follows as in this case under no checks and balances the poor pay maximum
taxes but get no transfers, while under checks and balances there is a positive probability they
will receive transfers. Part 2 follows after simple calculation by comparing (B-16) with (B-17).
The eﬀect of  in part 2 follows as the left-hand side of (B-18) is increasing in  while the
right-hand side of this equation is independent of 
It is easy to verify that also in this case the constitution will always involve checks and
balances when  = 0, and that all the comparative statics with respect to  and ¯ from the basic
model is still valid. More interesting, as discussed in the main paper now income distribution
also matters for the choice of constitution. A more unequal income distribution, that is a higher
, makes a constitution without checks and balances more likely.
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Further Proofs
Proof of Part 1.(b) of Proposition B-4 in Section 2.2
In this Appendix we provide analytical details behind Part 1.(b) in Proposition B-4. Recall
that the rich lobby now can propose a bribe for policy in all policy dimensions and    .
To simplify the exposition, note also that for any combination of rents  and bribes  , both
politicians and all other agents just care about sum of these two, and thus without loss of
generality we can set  =  = 0, so that all payments to politicians are in the form of bribes.
Furthermore, without loss of any generality we set  = ¯ so that if an income group is proposed
to get higher income this is through targeted transfers. Again, note that the budget constraint
will be satisfied with equality as the rich lobby can always increase their utility by proposing
unused funds as transfers to themselves. Inserting from the budget constraint in the utility of
the rich that ˆ  = (¯ ¯ − (1− ) ˆ ), the rich lobby then solves the program
max
{ˆˆ ˆ}
(1− ¯)  − ˆ
 + ˆ
 +
¯ ¯ − (1− ) ˆ 
 subject to (B-19)

³
ˆ
´
+ (1− )
³
(1− ¯) + ˆ 
´
≥ (1− ) 

³
ˆ
´
+ (1− )
³
(1− ¯) + ˆ 
´
≥ (1− ) 
ˆ ≥ 0
ˆ ≥ 0
ˆ  ≥ 0
Denoting the multipliers on the five constraints in (B-19) by 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, the first-order
conditions are:
−1 + 1
0
³
ˆ
´
+ 3 = 0 (B-20)
−1 + 2
0
³
ˆ
´
+ 4 = 0 (B-21)
−(1− ) + 1(1− ) + 2(1− ) + 5 = 0 (B-22)
From the participation constraints of the politicians it follows immediately that the non-
negative constraints on bribes and transfers to the poor can not all be binding at once. Thus,
we have three possible cases.
Case (1). If 3 4  0 then ˆ = ˆ = 0, in which case 5 = 0 so that ˆ   0. Thus in
this case, there are no bribes.
Case (2). If 5  0 then ˆ  = 0, in which case 3 = 4 = 0 so ˆ ˆ  0. We note from
(B-20) and (B-21) that 1 and 2 are both positive, implying that the participation constraints of
both politicians are satisfied with equality. Furthermore, both participation constraints satisfied
with equality implies that ˆ = ˆ , and thus that 1 = 2. From (B-20) we find
1 = 10
³
ˆ
´ 
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Combining this with (B-22), we obtain
5 = 1−  −
2(1− )
0
³
ˆ
´ 
Thus the condition for 5  0 reduces to
0
³
ˆ
´
 2(1− ) (1− )  (B-23)
From the participation constraint of the legislator holding with equality, ˆ is obtained as

³
ˆ
´
+ (1− ) (1− ¯) = (1− ) 
which is equivalent to

³
ˆ
´
=
(1− ) (1− )¯ ¯
1−   (B-24)
Since in this case ˆ is decreasing in  we have that ˆ = ˆ() with ˆ0()  0. Combining
(B-23) and (B-24), the condition for 5  0 reduces to
0
³
ˆ()
´

³
ˆ()
´  2
(1− )¯ ¯  (B-25)
The left-hand side of this condition is increasing in , while the right-hand side is independent
of . The following equation thus implicitly defines a critical value of , denoted by :
0
³
ˆ()
´

³
ˆ()
´ = 2
(1− )¯ ¯  (B-26)
Substituting for 
³
ˆ()
´
from (B-24) we find
 = 1
1 + 12(1− )0
³
ˆ()
´  (B-27)
Note from (B-24) that ˆ() is decreasing in  and that as  approaches one the bribe ap-
proaches zero. Thus from (B-27)  is decreasing in  and approaches zero as  approaches
one.
Recall that we are focusing on the case where    . Thus if    then the condition
for 5  0 is always satisfied. From (B-6) and (B-27),    is equivalent to
0
³
ˆ()
´
 20(¯ ¯)
which is always satisfied provided that  is suﬃciently high, i.e., provided that the distribution
of income is suﬃciently unequal (this follows since the right-hand side is decreasing in  while
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the left-hand side is increasing in  and approaches infinity as  approaches zero). Let ∗ be
defined by
0
³
ˆ()
´
= 20(∗¯ ¯)
Thus when   ∗ then 5  0 and ˆ  = 0. When   ∗ then 5  0 and ˆ  = 0 only when
  . In these cases the bribing proposal contains no income transfers to the poor, only
bribes to the politicians.
Finally in this case, it can be verified that the participation constraint of the rich is satisfied
with strict inequality. To see this, observe that the rich are strictly better oﬀ when (1− ¯)  −
2ˆ + ¯ ¯  , which is equivalent to (1 − )¯ ¯  2ˆ. At the same time we know from
(B-25) that
(1− )¯ ¯ 
2
³
ˆ
´
0
³
ˆ
´ 
Thus the participation constraint must hold provided that

³
ˆ
´
 ˆ0
³
ˆ
´
 (B-28)
which is always satisfied in light of the strict concavity of the  function.
Case (3). If 3 = 4 = 5 = 0, then ˆ ˆ  ˆ   0. From (B-20), (B-21) and (B-22) we
then find
0
³
ˆ
´
=
2(1− )
 (1− )  (B-29)
which determines ˆ = ˆ() ≡ ∗ with ˆ0()  0. Thus note that in this case ˆ is increasing
in .
From the participation constraint of the legislator satisfied with equality, ˆ  is given by

³
ˆ
´
+ (1− )
³
(1− ¯) + ˆ 
´
= (1− ) 
This implies
ˆ  = (1− )¯ ¯
1−  −

³
ˆ
´
1−   (B-30)
Combining this with (B-29), we obtain
ˆ  = 1
1− 
⎛
⎝(1− )¯ ¯ −
2
³
ˆ()
´
0
³
ˆ()
´
⎞
⎠  (B-31)
which is positive if and only if    (which can be verified from (B-26) and taking into account
that in this case ˆ0()  0).
It now only remains to show that the participation constraint of the rich is satisfied also in
this case. To see this, note that the participation constraint in this case is (1− ¯)  − 2ˆ +
(¯ ¯ − (1− ) ˆ )  , which is equivalent to (1 − )¯ ¯  2ˆ + (1− ) ˆ . Inserting from
(B-31) we again get (B-28), which is always satisfied.
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To summarize, when    , there are two possible scenarios, corresponding to parts (i)
and (ii) in part 1.(b) of Proposition B-4, respectively:
i. If   ∗ or   , then there will be bribing with positive bribes and no transfers to
the poor.
ii. If   ∗ and   , then there will be bribing with positive bribes and positive transfers
to the poor.
Analysis of Multi-Member Legislatures from Section 2.3
In this appendix, we characterize the equilibrium under checks and balances with a multi-member
legislatures, focusing on the case where   ∗ and   .
The utility of the poor voters when the constitution does not include checks and balances
is given by (B-3). However, now under checks and balances, with probability  the legislator
making the spending decisions represents the rich. Policy in the case without bribery is not
aﬀected, as the tax rate in this case is still zero. But when politicians can be bribed and when
the legislator is from the rich, then the equilibrium is diﬀerent than in the case with a legislator
from the poor. This is because, as we now show, making an oﬀer including transfers to the poor
becomes less valuable to the rich, as now this only increases the utility of the president and not
of the legislator.
Let us focus on the case where the legislator originates from the rich (while the president
originates from the poor). The rich lobby can again propose a bribe, and again without loss
of generality, we can set  =  = 0, and  = ¯ . Furthermore, if the rich make a bribing
proposal (that gives themselves greater utility), they can always get the legislator from the rich
to accept this as the participation constraint of the rich legislator is given by

³
ˆ
´
+ (1− )
Ã
(1− ¯)  − ˆ
 + ˆ
 +
¯ ¯ − (1− ) ˆ 

!
≥ (1− ) 
which holds with strict inequality even when ˆ = 0 as long as the rich are obtaining greater
utility with this proposal than without. Thus ˆ = 0 and the rich lobby solves the program
max
{ˆ ˆ}
(1− ¯)  − ˆ

 +
¯ ¯ − (1− ) ˆ 
 subject to (B-32)

³
ˆ
´
+ (1− )
³
(1− ¯) + ˆ 
´
≥ (1− ) 
ˆ  ≥ 0
Denoting the multipliers on the two constraints in (B-32) by 1and 2, the first-order conditions
are that ˆ and ˆ  satisfies:
−1 + 1
0
³
ˆ
´
= 0 (B-33)
−1−  + 1(1− ) + 2 = 0 (B-34)
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From (B-33) it follows that 1  0, implying that the participation constraint of the president
binds. Now solving for 1 from (B-33) in (B-34), we find that 2  0 and thus ˆ  = 0 if

1− 
0
³
ˆ
´
 1
1−   (B-35)
From the participation constraint of the president satisfied with equality, it follows that ˆ is
again determined by

³
ˆ
´
=
(1− ) (1− )¯ ¯
1−   (B-36)
Since ˆ is decreasing in  in this case, we have that ˆ = ˆ() with ˆ0()  0. Combining
(B-35) and (B-36) the condition for 2  0 reduces to
0
³
ˆ()
´

³
ˆ()
´  1
(1− )¯ ¯ 
The left-hand side of this condition is increasing in , while the right-hand side is independent
of . The following equation thus implicitly defines a critical value of , which we denote by
 :
0
³
ˆ()
´

³
ˆ()
´ = 1
(1− )¯ ¯ 
From (B-24), evaluated at  , we have

³
ˆ()
´
=
(1− ) (1− )¯ ¯
(1− ) 
Substituting this in the previous expression, we obtain
 = 1
1 + (1− )0
³
ˆ()
´  
This implies that, compared with the case where the legislator is poor, the parameter space
where ˆ  = 0 is now larger (i.e., includes smaller values of ) when the legislator selected to
decide spending is from the rich.
If    , then we have ˆ  = 0. (Note also that the participation constraint for the rich
lobby in this case is simply ¯ ¯  ˆ , which is satisfied with strict inequality as ˆ  ∗  ¯¯).
If, on the other hand,    , then we have ˆ   0. From (B-33) and (B-34) we then find
that ˆ is determined by
0
³
ˆ
´
=
1− 
 (1− )  (B-37)
which implies that now ˆ = ∗ is greater than in the case where the legislator originates from
the poor, i.e., ∗  ∗, since now it is more eﬃcient to use bribes rather than income transfers
to the poor in capturing the president. Moreover, as a consequence, the participation constraint
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of the president implies that the transfer to the poor is now lower compared to the case where
the legislator is poor. In particular, from the participation constraint of the president, we have
ˆ  = ¯(1− )¯
1−  −
 (∗)
1−  
which is identical to (B-30) except that now ˆ = ∗ is greater and thus ˆ  is lower. Combining
this with (B-37), we obtain
ˆ  = 1
1− 
µ
¯(1− )¯ −  (
∗)
0 (∗)
¶

Finally, it can be verified in a similar manner that in this case too the participation constraint
of the rich is satisfied with strict inequality (given that  (∗)  ∗0 (∗)).
Summing up, recalling that the probability the spending legislator originates from the rich
is given by , we have:
Proposition B-10 Suppose that   ∗ and   , and that under checks and balances, there
is a multi-member legislature.
1. Consider first the case where there is checks and balances and the legislator selected to
decide spending is from the rich. Then:
(a) When  = 0 so that there is no bribing, the equilibrium involves  = 0,  = 0,
 = 0,   = 0, and   = 0, and the utility of poor agents is given by (1−)¯ (1− );
(b) When  = 1, there exists an    such that:
i. If    , then  = ¯ ,  = 0,  = 0,   0,  = 0,   = 0, and    0.
ii. If    , then  = ¯ ,  = 0,  = 0,  = ∗,  = 0,    0, and    0.
2. Now taking into account that the probability the rich can solve their collective action prob-
lem and bribe politicians is  and the probability that the legislator selected to decide spend-
ing will be from the rich with probability , we have that:
(a) If    , then the expected utility of poor agents is
 [ = 1] = 1
1− 
µ
(1− )¯ − (1− )¯ ¯ −  (1− ) 2(
∗)
0 (∗)
¶
; (B-38)
(b) If    , then the expected utility of poor agents is
 [ = 1] = 1
1− 
µ
(1− )¯ −   (
∗)
0 (∗) −  (1− )
2(∗)
0 (∗)
¶
 (B-39)
Proposition B-6 then follows by comparing the utility of the poor from (B-3) with (B-38)
and (B-39), respectively.
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Analysis of   0 from Section 2.4
We here look at the case where the ego rents  can take any value. Let us focus on a constitution
not involving checks and balances, i.e.,  = 0. Consider first the case where  = 0 so that the
rich can not bribe the president. The balance between direct transfers to the poor and rents
to the president depends on how much the president values own rents relative to how he values
utility of the poor. Define
 ≡

¯
1−  + ¯  + ¯
and
 ≡ ¯ +

¯
1−  + ¯  + ¯

The balance between direct transfers to the poor and rents to the president is then given by the
solution to the maximization problem in (B-14):
If    ,   = 0, and  = ¯ ¯.
If  ≤  ≤  ,
  = (¯ − (1−  + ¯ )) ¯
1−  +
1− 
1−   (B-40)
and
 = (1−  + ¯ )¯ − (1− ) (B-41)
If    ,   = ¯ ¯(1− ), and  = 0.
Next, suppose that  = 1. Again the rich lobby can never strictly increase its utility by
oﬀering a bribe that the president will accept. Any such oﬀer is payoﬀ equivalent for all parties
and without loss of any generality we set ˆ = 0. The following proposition summarizes the
case where the constitution does not have checks and balances:
Proposition B-11 Suppose  = 0. Then the equilibrium policy always has  = ¯ , and:
1. If    ,   = 0. The utility of poor agents in this case is  [ = 0] = (1 − )(1 −
¯)¯(1− ).
2. If  ≤  ≤  , transfers are given by (B-40). The utility of poor agents in this case is
 [ = 0] = 1− 
1− 
µ
1−  + ¯  + ¯
¶
¯ (B-42)
3. If   ,   = ¯ ¯(1 − ). The utility of poor agents in this case is  [ = 0] =
(1−  + ¯ )¯(1− ).
The case where the constitution involves checks and balances, i.e.  = 1, and there is not
bribing, i.e.  = 0, is as discussed in the main text.
Next consider the case where there is bribing, i.e.  = 1, and consider first the case where
   . Then also with checks and balances in the constitution the president gets his preferred
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policy where all public income is used as transfers to the poor. If the rich lobby tries to bribe
the president into setting a lower tax rate or to give the rich transfers they cannot get strictly
higher utility. Thus ˆ = 0.
Consider next the case where   . The rich lobby then solves the program
max
{ˆ ˆ}
(1− ¯) ¯
 −
ˆ
 +
¯ ¯ − (1− ) ˆ 
 subject to³
ˆ + 
´ µ(1− )(1− ¯)¯
1−  + ˆ

¶1−
≥ 
µ
(1−  + ¯ )¯
1− 
¶1−
ˆ  ≥ 0
Denoting the multipliers on the two constraints by 1 and 2, the first-order conditions are that
the derivatives of the maximization problem with respect to ˆ and ˆ  satisfy:
−1 + 1
³
ˆ + 
´−1µ(1− )(1− ¯)¯
1−  + ˆ

¶1−
= 0 (B-43)
and
−1−  + 1 (1− )
³
ˆ + 
´ µ(1− )(1− ¯)¯
1−  + ˆ

¶−
+ 2 = 0 (B-44)
From (B-43) it follows that 1  0, implying that the participation constraint of the president
binds. Now solving for 1 from (B-43) and inserting in (B-44), we find that 2  0 and thus
ˆ  = 0 if
(1− )(1− ¯)¯  (1− )
³
ˆ + 
´

Using the participation constraint of the president with ˆ  = 0 this can be reformulated as
 

¯
³
1−+¯ 
1−+¯ −¯
´ 1−
(1− )(1− ¯) + ¯
³
1−+¯ 
1−+¯ −¯
´ 1−
where the left-hand side is increasing in  while the right-hand side is decreasing in . The
following equation thus implicitly defines a unique value of , ∗, such that
∗ =

¯
³
1−+¯ 
1−+¯ −¯
´ 1−∗∗
(1− )(1− ¯) + ¯
³
1−+¯ 
1−+¯ −¯
´ 1−∗∗ 
If   ∗ then we have ˆ  = 0. The utility of poor agents in this case is given by
 [ = 1  = 1] = (1− ) (1− ¯)¯
1−  
In contrast, if   ∗, then 2 = 0 and ˆ   0. In this case, we have:
(1− )
µ
(1− )(1− ¯)¯
1−  + ˆ

¶
= (1− )
³
ˆ + 
´

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Using the participation constraint for the president to substitute for ˆ +  we find
(1− )(1− ¯)¯
1−  + ˆ
 =
µ
1− 
(1− )
¶ µ
¯
¶ µ1−  + ¯ 
1− 
¶1−
¯
which determines ˆ  and it also follows that the utility of poor agents in this case is given by
 [ = 1  = 1] =
µ
1− 

¶ µ
¯
¶
(1−  + ¯ )1− ¯
1− 
  [ = 1  = 0] 
It is then straightforward to show that, similarly to before, the rich get a strictly higher utility
by the bribe for policy proposal than without, and we proceed without repeating the proof for
this.
The preceding analysis has established (proof in text):
Proposition B-12 Suppose that the constitution involves checks and balances (i.e.,  = 1).
1. When  = 0 so that the rich lobby is not organized and there is no bribing, the equilibrium
involves  = ¯ ,  = 0,  = 0, and   = ¯ ¯(1− ).
2. When  = 1 so that the rich lobby is organized and there is bribing, then the equilibrium
is as follows:
(a) If   , then:
i. If   ∗, then  = ¯ , and  = 0,  = 0,   0,  = 0, and   = 0.
ii. If   ∗, then  = 0,  = 0,   0,  = 0,  = ¯ , and    0.
Taking into account that the probability the rich can solve their collective action
problem and bribe politicians is , we have that:
If   ∗ the expected utility of poor agents is given by
 [ = 1] = (1−  + ¯ ) ¯
1−  − 
¯ ¯
1−   (B-45)
If   ∗ the expected utility of poor agents is given by
 [ = 1] = (1− )(1−  + ¯ ) ¯
1−  (B-46)
+
µ
1− 

¶ µ
¯
¶
(1−  + ¯ )1− ¯
1−  
(b) If   , then there is no bribing and the expected utility of poor agents is given by
(1−  + ¯ )¯(1− ).
Finally, in the referendum on checks and balances we then have:
Proposition B-13 1. When    the constitution will involve checks and balances.
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2. When  ≤  ≤  then
(a) When   ∗ the constitution will involve no checks and balances if
   (1−  + ¯ )− (1− )
¯
¯  (B-47)
and it will involve checks and balances if the converse inequality holds.
(b) When   ∗ the constitution will involve no checks and balances if
 − 
µ
1− 

¶ µ
¯
¶
(1−  + ¯ )−   − (1− )

¯
1−  + ¯   (B-48)
and it will involve checks and balances if the converse inequality holds.
In both cases, a greater  (a higher likelihood of the rich lobby being organized) makes
a constitution without checks and balances more likely.
3. When    voters are indiﬀerent between a constitution with and without checks and
balances.
Proof. Part 1 follows as in this case under no checks and balances the poor pay maximum
taxes but get no transfers, while under checks and balances there is a positive probability they
will get transfers. Parts 2.(a) and 2.(b) follow after simple calculation by comparing (B-42)
with (B-45) and (B-46), respectively. The eﬀect of  in part 2 follows as the left-hand sides
of (B-47) and (B-48) are both increasing in  while the left-hand sides of (B-47) and (B-48)
are independent of  (To see that the left-hand side of (B-48) is increasing in  note that this
reduces to the condition  [ = 1  = 1]   [ = 1  = 0] which is always satisfied). Part 3
follows as in this case policy is the same whether the constitution involves checks and balances
or not.
B-23
